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Abstract 
This paper analyses the work of the Nobel Prize winning economist Professor 
Amartya Sen from the perspective of human rights. It assesses the ways in 
which Sen’s research agenda has deepened and expanded human rights 
discourse in the disciplines of ethics and economics, and examines how his 
work has promoted cross-fertilisation and integration on this subject across 
traditional disciplinary divides. The paper suggests that Sen’s development of a 
‘scholarly bridge’ between human rights and economics is an important and 
innovative contribution that has methodological as well as substantive 
importance and that provides a prototype and stimuli for future research. It also 
establishes that the idea of fundamental freedoms and human rights is itself an 
important gateway into understanding the nature, scope and significance of 
Sen’s research. The paper concludes with a brief assessment of the challenges to 
be addressed in taking Sen’s contributions in the field of human rights forward.  
 
JEL Classifications: A12, A13, B31, D63, I39, K39 
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Introduction and Overview 
This paper analyses the contributions of the Nobel Laureate Professor Amartya 
Sen in the field of human rights. The motivation for the paper is three-fold. 
First, Sen’s contributions in the disciplines of ethics and economics have 
deepened and expanded theoretical discourse on human rights in important and 
influential ways. In ethics, Sen’s work has challenged the exclusion of poverty, 
hunger and starvation from the characterisation of fundamental freedoms and 
human rights, and has contributed to the development of a framework in which 
authoritatively recognised international standards in the field of poverty and 
human rights can be meaningfully conceptualised and coherently understood. In 
economics, Sen has established a far-reaching critique of standard frameworks 
that fail to take account of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and has 
pioneered the development of new paradigms and approaches that take account 
of these concerns. The paper provides an analytical overview of Sen’s work in 
ethics and economics from the perspective of human rights and assesses the 
ways in which Sen’s research agenda has deepened and expanded human rights 
discourse in each of these disciplines. 
 
The second motivation for the paper is the more practical need for a ‘scholarly 
bridge’ between human rights and the discipline of economics (as highlighted 
by Mary Robinson, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights). 
Whereas there is a wide perception of a conflict between human rights on the 
one hand and economics on the other – with fundamental freedoms and human 
dignity being seen as opposed to economic efficiency and the optimal allocation 
of resources, Robinson contends that human rights advocacy could often be 
strengthened by economic analysis. For example, arguments for shared 
international responsibility for the implementation of social and economic rights 
would often be supported by theoretical and empirical research in economics; 
whilst the development of ‘common ground’ through a programme of inter-
disciplinary research and consensus-building could provide a framework for the 
shaping of new and emerging ‘big’ ideas such as ‘ethical globalisation’ — the 
idea that processes of globalisation including economic processes should be 
subject to moral considerations including the ethical and legal principles 
entailed by the idea of human rights (Robinson, 2002). The current paper 
addresses the ways in which Sen’s research agenda has promoted 
interdisciplinary cross-fertilisation and integration and suggests that his work 
provides an important prototype and stimuli for an interdisciplinary research 
programme of this type. 
 
The third motivation is that the idea of fundamental freedoms and human rights 
itself provides a useful gateway into Sen’s work. Sen’s research in ethics and 
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economics over a period of more than thirty years covers a vast and complex 
terrain and can at times seem technical and fragmented. The idea of 
fundamental human freedoms and human rights provides an important unifying 
and overarching theme. Viewing Sen’s research contributions through this lens 
provides a means of orientation through the complexities and technicalities and 
is key to the understanding of the nature and scope of Sen’s work and its 
influence on international policies and debates.  
 
Paper Organisation 
The paper is divided into two main parts. Part 1 focuses on Sen’s contributions 
in ethics. It analyses how Sen’s work challenges the exclusion of poverty, 
hunger and starvation from the characterisation of fundamental freedoms and 
human rights, and provides a conceptual framework in which authoritatively 
recognised international standards in this field can be meaningfully elucidated 
and coherently understood. Part 2 focuses on Sen’s contributions in economics. 
It sets out Sen’s critique of standard frameworks in theoretical and empirical 
economics that fail to take account of fundamental freedoms and human rights 
and analyses his pioneering contributions towards an ‘expanded’ economics 
agenda that takes account of these concerns. Emphasis is placed throughout the 
ways in which Sen’s contributions have promoted interdisciplinary cross-
fertilisation and integration in ethics and economics on the subject of human 
rights; and the ways in which the idea of fundamental freedoms and human 
rights itself provides an important gateway into understanding the nature and 
scope and importance of Sen’s work. The paper concludes by outlining some of 
the key challenges for the future development of this work.  
 3
 
BOX 1 
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF AMARTYA SEN IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
INDIVIDUAL SUSBSTANTIVE FREEDOMS AS THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF 
EVALUATIVE EXERCISES CONCERNING BASIC HUMAN INTERESTS IN 
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 
 
   
SEN’S CONTRIBUTIONS IN ETHICS  SEN’S CONTRIBUTIONS IN 
ECONOMICS 
 
   
Critique of ethical frameworks with 
other informational focuses (e.g. utility, 
formal freedoms and rights/liberty 
‘primary goods’ 
 Critique of standard frameworks in 
theoretical and empirical 
economics that focus on income 
and utility 
 
   
Elucidation of a class of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights (and 
associated obligations) that focus on 
the valuable things that people can do 
and be 
 Development of a ‘freedom-
centred’ economics that takes a 
direct account of valuable things 
that people can and do achieve 
 
   
Support for the admissibility of poverty, 
hunger and starvation as ‘freedom 
restricting’ conditions 
 Support for the intrinsic and 
instrumental valuation of 
fundamental freedoms and human 
rights in economic analysis 
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1. Sen’s Contributions in Ethics 
Is poverty a denial of basic human rights? The Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights (1948) establishes international standards in the field of poverty and 
human rights – including the human right of everyone to a standard of living 
adequate for health and well-being (including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services) and to free and compulsory 
elementary education. This cluster of human rights has long-since been codified 
in international treaties in legally binding form1 and the international 
recognition of poverty as a human rights issue has been strengthened in recent 
years.2 Yet influential discourses in ethics and political theory in both libertarian 
traditions and liberal traditions have excluded poverty, hunger and starvation 
from the domain of fundamental freedoms and human rights or provide an 
inadequate basis for conceptualising authoritatively recognized international 
standards in this field (sections 1.1.-1.2). This includes frameworks that focus 
exclusively on negative freedom and negative rights and that fail to take account 
of poverty, hunger and starvation as ‘freedom-restricting’ conditions (e.g. 
Hayek, Nozick) and frameworks allow for a more sensitive handling of poverty 
issues but nevertheless fail to provide an adequate basis for emerging 
international standards in this field (e.g. Berlin, Rawls and O’Neill). In contrast, 
the ‘capability approach’ developed by Sen and others3 provides a framework in 
which freedom from poverty, hunger and starvation can be meaningfully 
conceptualised as fundamental human rights that all governments have 
obligations to respect, protect and promote (1.3). Salient features of this 
                                                     
1  See Articles 25 and 26 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) has been 
signed and ratified by more than 140 countries. This instrument affirms inter alia the 
right of the individual to an adequate standard of living including adequate food and 
shelter (Article 11), the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health (Article 12), and the right of access to education and free primary education 
(Articles 13 and 14), and assigns legally binding international obligations on state 
parties – both individually and through international assistance and co-operation 
(Article 2). 
2  For example, in 1997, Mary Robinson, the then UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, stated that ‘Poverty itself is a violation of numerous basic human rights’ 
(Robinson 1997). In 2000, The Millenium Declaration adopted by world leaders as a 
statement of values, principles and objectives for the twenty-first century included the 
promotion and protection of all internationally recognized human rights (economic, 
social and cultural as well as civil and political) and set deadlines for collective 
actions in the field of poverty eradication (UNGA 2000). 
3  This paper analyses the development of the ‘capability approach’ in Sen’s work. For 
Nussbaum’s contributions, see, for example Nussbaum (1993, 1995, 1997, 1999abc, 
2000, 2003).  
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framework include support for a broad class of fundamental freedoms and 
human rights that focuses on the valuable things that people can do and be 
(1.3.1); support for a ‘non-absolutist’ model that accommodates hierarchies, 
balancing and trade-offs (1.3.2); strengthened support for positive obligations of 
assistance and aid (1.3.3); support for universalism against the relativist and 
culture-based critiques (1.3.4). 
 
1.1  Negative theories of fundamental freedoms and human rights and the 
treatment of poverty, hunger and starvation  
There is wide international acceptance of the principle that both negative and 
positive freedoms are the objects of human rights that ought to be protected and 
promoted by governments. In the past, the focus of international human rights 
concern was often on civil and political rights, rather than economic, social and 
cultural rights. This emphasis has shifted over the last decade. The economic 
and social rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration have now been 
codified in legally binding international human rights treaties – including the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 
International Convention on the Rights of the Child. At the domestic level, these 
human rights are increasingly being incorporated into Constitutional Law. In 
addition, the past tendency to interpret civil and political rights exclusively in 
terms of negative duties of omission, non-interference and restraint (rather than 
in terms of positive duties of action and commission) has now been widely 
rejected. The principle that all human rights (civil, political, economic, social 
and cultural) entail positive guarantees (of protection, promotion and assistance) 
as well as negative guarantees of (immunity, non-interference and restraint) has 
been developed in the jurisprudential literature (e.g. Eide (1998, 1999)) and is 
authoritatively established in human rights case law at the international, 
regional and domestic levels.4 Yet the search for objectivity in ethics has often 
resulted in the development of theories of fundamental freedoms and human 
rights that focus on personal liberty, and are exclusive of poverty, hunger and 
starvation. Influential theories in both the libertarian and liberal traditions have 
emphasised the development of ethical categories that are independent of ‘end-
state’ principles – such as a particular conception of ‘human good’ or ‘human 
goods’ or ‘human flourishing’. This emphasis is associated with theories of 
negative freedoms and negative rights (that focus on the absence of intentional 
interference by other people, and that claim to be logically independent of the 
valuable things that people can do or be) and theories of negative obligation 
                                                     
4  Vizard (2000a, 46-52) provides an overview of the development of the concept of 
positive obligation at the international level (in the jurisprudence of the various UN 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies); at the regional level (in the Case Law of the European 
Court on Human Rights); and at the domestic level (e.g. in Indian and South African 
Case Law). 
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(that focus on negative obligations of immunity and restraint rather than 
positive obligations to defend and support the valuable things that people can do 
and be). These theories are in turn associated with proposition that the range of 
fundamental freedoms is limited, and that poverty is inadmissible as a ‘freedom-
restricting’ condition (Box 2).  
 
BOX 2 
ADMISSIBILITY OF POVERTY AS A “FREEDOM-RESTRICTING” 
CONDITION 
Specification of the range of (external) constraints that count as “limits” on human freedom 
 
 
 
 
 
Narrower Broader 
 
 
 
 
 
“Negative freedom” Relevance of “substantive opportunity” to human 
freedom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Hobbes Hayek 
Nozick 
Berlin Rawls Sen 
  
“Physical 
coercion” 
 
 
 “Intentional Actions” 
 
  “deliberate 
human 
arrangements” 
(including 
poverty when 
caused by 
“deliberate 
human 
arrangements”) 
 
 
 “End independence”  Relevance of 
substantive 
opportunity to 
the value of 
freedom 
Direct relevance of 
substantive 
opportunity to the 
characterisation of 
freedom 
    
 
 
 
 
   Emphasis on 
the relevance 
of “all-purpose” 
means to 
freedom and 
primary goods 
to the value of 
freedom 
Elucidation of a 
sub-class of 
freedoms and 
human rights that 
focus directly on 
the valuable things 
a person can do 
and be 
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‘End-independence’ and the negative view of fundamental freedoms and human 
rights  
Hayek (1960, 1982abc) and Nozick (1974) suggest that impartiality in ethics 
requires an ‘end-independent’ approach that focuses on procedures and rules, 
rather than consequences, outcomes and results. This emphasis underlies 
Hayek’s characterisation of individual freedom in exclusively negative terms — 
as the absence of coercion, with coercion defined in terms of intentional 
interference by other people in a protected individual domain. He maintains that 
this characterisation makes the evaluation of individual freedom independent of 
(1) the fulfilment of individual needs, opportunities, desires and the ability or 
effective power to fulfil particular goals; (2) the outcomes of impersonal 
circumstances and processes (including competitive market allocations and the 
outcomes of socio-economic processes of development and growth).5 Hayek’s 
(1982b, 35-55, 103-4) defence of the negative view of fundamental or human 
rights also arises in this context. According to Hayek’s theory, fundamental 
principles of justice take the form of ‘end-independent’ general and abstract 
rules that consistently apply to everyone on an equal basis without exception. 
Furthermore, he contends that whereas negative rights can be characterised in 
this abstract and general form (and fall within the scope of the ‘fundamental 
principles of justice’) positive rights cannot. In Hayek’s view, positive rights ‘to 
particular things’ are only possible in the context of voluntary agreements 
and/or special relationships (such as tie-relationships) and require the 
assignment of responsibility to particular agents (in the form of counter-party 
obligations to ensure that the benefits of the right are provided). As universal 
claims they indeterminate — because there is no rational principle (or universal 
rule) that can prescribe the particular actions that particular obligation holders 
should undertake in specific situations. Hayek develops a critique of the 
economic and social human rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in this context. He argues that these ‘rights’ represent positive 
                                                     
5  Hayek’s characterization of individual freedom draws on a theory of responsibility 
that combines the standard proposition that people are only responsible for states of 
affairs that they intentionally cause, with a social and economic theory that 
characterizes a wide range of socio-economic phenomena as ‘unintended outcomes’ 
for which nobody is responsible. Hayek consciously builds here on empiricist 
approaches that identify a category of phenomena that arise as ‘the result of human 
action but not the execution of human design’. For example, in developing Smith’s 
theory of the ‘invisible hand’, Hayek emphasizes that competitive market allocations 
arise not as an ‘intended outcome’ of some foreseen purpose or plan, but as a result of 
the actions of millions of self-interested economic agents acting independently, in a 
‘self-generating’ process of adaptation and cumulative growth. He argues that 
‘unintended outcomes’ of this type (1) fall outside the ambit of human responsibility; 
(2) cannot be categorized as just or unjust; (3) fall outside the range of ‘freedom-
restricting’ conditions. See, for example, Hayek (1960, 54- 70; 1982b 107-132). 
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claims to ‘particular things’ to which every human being is entitled but for 
which no distinct agent is responsible; and that claims of this type cannot be 
universalised within the framework of a free society (1960, 1-22, 71-84 133-
147); 1982b, 101-106).6   
 
The logical structure of the libertarian rights  
Nozick (1974, 28-30) also sets out an exclusively negative approach to 
fundamental freedoms and human rights. His development of the “outcome-
independent” approach suggests that a neutral vantage-point in ethics can be 
achieved by adopting a deontological form of reasoning that is independent of 
the evaluation of consequences. This emphasis gives rise to an “absolutist” 
model of individual rights as constraints on action that cannot be violated under 
any circumstances7. Nozick’s position may be understood in terms of a logical 
condition (the “condition of universalization”) that relates to the admissibility of 
obligations as “universal obligations” (Box 3). The libertarian interpretation of 
this condition focuses on the question of whether it is logically possible for 
counterpart duties (in the form of actions) to be performed by all duty-holders 
without exception. Negative obligations of non-interference and non-
intervention are viewed as being associated with duties that (1) involve negative 
actions of omission and restraint (2) are not subject to feasibility and resource 
constraints (3) are logically co-possible in the sense of being individually and 
simultaneously feasible. For example, it is feasible for a person to refrain from 
undertaking a certain action (such as interfering in another person’s “private 
sphere” or interfering with their property) in respect of all others. In contrast, 
positive obligations of assistance and aid are viewed as giving rise to duties that 
entail positive acts of commission that may not be logically co-possible. The 
                                                     
6  ‘[Such rights] could not be made universal within a system of rules of just conduct 
based on the conception of individual responsibility … [T]he old civil rights and the 
new social and economic rights … are in fact incompatible’ (Hayek, 1982b, 103-4).  
7  Nozick’s (1974, 28-30, 164-166) characterisation of rights as “side-constraints” seems 
to provide a paradigmatic example of an “absolustist” model. This characterisation 
seems to suggest that rights and duties are non-contingent (in the sense of applying in 
all circumstances) and categorical (in the sense that their violation is always wrong). 
Certainly, Nozick supports the thesis of the mutual co-possibility of rights and duties, 
and rules out rights-maximisations over populations and balancing and trade-offs with 
other goals. For example, he maintains that the idea off balancing-off individual rights 
in an overall system of maximum rights-fulfilment for a population as a whole - or 
trading off individual rights in pursuit of other (non-rights related) end-state 
principles or goals - goes against the very essence of the idea individual rights; and 
that the objective of rights-maximisation can result in a “utilitarianism” of rights 
(1974, 28). However, Nozick’s concession to the possibility of violations in order to 
prevent “catastrophic moral horrors” challenges this “absolutist” interpretation, and 
the moral constraints in Nozick’s theory may after all provide a “weighty reason” for 
non-violation, rather than an absolute prohibition. 
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performance of positive duties of this type may incur costs and be limited by 
resource and feasibility constraints. For example, it may not feasible for a 
person to perform a particular positive action (such as “feeding those in need”) 
in respect of all others. The “mutual incompatibility” of positive duties of this 
type is taken to rule out the possibility of “universal positive obligations” in the 
libertarian framework. Nozick contends that the entire set of individual rights 
that satisfy these conditions comprises a set of negative rights that is associated 
with exclusively negative duties of omission and restraint. Negative conceptions 
of the human rights to “freedom from severe poverty” and to “freedom from 
hunger and starvation” that focus on non-interference with the “means of life” 
(e.g. with the person or property) are admissible in this framework. However, 
fundamental freedoms and human rights that are limited by resources and/or 
other feasibility constraints (such as the human rights to an adequate standard of 
living, food and health) are viewed as generating “conflicting positive 
obligations” and are ruled out by the model. 
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BOX 3 
THE “CONDITION OF UNIVERSALISATION” AS AN ADMISSIBILITY CONDITION 
FOR “UNIVERSAL RIGHTS” 
(SUMMARY OF THE LIBERTARIAN INTERPRETATION) 
 
Can the counterpart duties be “universalised” ( i.e. performed all duty holders without 
exceptions) ? 
 
Negative rights Positive rights 
 
 
 
 
Negative obligations Positive obligations 
  
Non-intervention, non-
interference, i.e. entail 
omissions 
Assistance, aid 
i.e. entail actions 
  
“Co-possible” May not be “co-possible” 
(feasibility constraints – 
limits to individual / 
collective action, 
resource scarcity) 
  
Satisfy the “universalization 
condition” 
May not satisfy the 
“universalization condition” 
 
 
Berlin on negative freedom and value pluralism 
Influential theories in the liberal as well as the libertarian tradition have also 
suggested that impartiality in ethics requires the development of exclusively 
negative characterisations of fundamental freedoms and human rights. For 
example, Berlin (1969) maintains that value pluralism necessitates negative 
characterisations of freedoms and rights that are independent of the valuable 
things that a person can do and be. Like Hayek, he characterises freedom in 
terms of the absence of coercion by others, and suggests that only other people’s 
intentional actions can constrain or limit individual freedom; and that the 
characterisation of negative freedom is logically independent of the fulfilment 
of individual desires and of the power, ability or capacity of an individual to 
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achieve desired goals in practice.8 He is insistent that negative freedom should 
be characterised in a way that is independent of individual needs9 and that 
poverty can only be characterised as a limitation of freedom when it arises from 
‘deliberate human arrangements’ (1969, 122-123). The debates about the 
interpretation of Berlin’s position here have far-reaching implications for the 
specification and justification of a class fundamental freedoms and human 
rights. Plant contends that the phrase ‘human beings have made arrangements’ 
should probably be interpreted as implying intentionality. However, Berlin’s 
stated position depends on the socio-economic analysis of the causes of poverty, 
and broader readings are possible. For example, under a broader interpretation, 
the outcomes of social and economic processes (including market outcomes) 
might be characterised as ‘freedom limiting’ conditions if their consequences, 
though unintended, are foreseeable or alterable (1991: 235). Gray’s analysis 
emphasises this broader reading. He maintains that the phrase ‘deliberate human 
arrangements’ recognizes that ‘the reasonable attribution of human 
responsibility’ depends on a range of factors other than intentionality, with 
negative freedom limited by outcomes that are unintended but remediable, 
alterable, foreseeable and/or predictable (1989, 61-65; 1995a, 27). Sen also 
suggests a broad reading of Berlin’s position. He suggests that Berlin takes a 
‘demanding view of negative freedom’, going well beyond the ‘immunity’ 
component of process, and taking note ‘of the various parts that others play in 
making a person unable to do something’ (1993a: 524; 1981a). Indeed, many of 
Sen’s own pioneering contributions can be assessed in terms of the analytical 
space generated by this idea. Sen’s research in theoretical and empirical 
economics has made a major contribution to the evaluation of economic 
arrangements, processes and outcomes (including processes such as 
development, growth and globalization and competitive market outcomes) from 
the perspective of human freedoms and human rights rather than other 
                                                     
8  ‘You lack political liberty or freedom only if you are prevented from attaining a goal 
by human beings … Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human 
beings within the area in which I could otherwise act’ (1969,xl &122). There are, 
however, significant differences between Hayek and Berlin’s position. For example, 
Berlin concedes that any assessment of individual freedom is deeply evaluative, and 
will be dependent on answers to questions regarding the relative values of alternative 
opportunities and actions (1969, xxxix-xl, xlviii). He also develops the case for 
collective obligations to undertake the actions that are necessary to secure the 
minimum conditions of negative freedom. ‘Legal liberties are compatible with 
extremes of exploitation, brutality, and injustice. The case for intervention, by the 
state or other effective agencies, to secure conditions for ... at least a minimum degree 
of negative liberty for individuals, is overwhelmingly strong’ (1969, xlvi). 
9  ‘[Since you] lack political liberty or freedom only if you are prevented from attaining 
a goal by human beings … [it follows that] … mere incapacity to attain a goal is not 
lack of political freedom … To provide for material needs ... is not to expand liberty’ 
(1969, lv; 122, 124-5). 
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informational perspectives (e.g. including utility or growth). His research has 
pushed forward understanding of the ways in which the denial and violation of 
human freedoms can sometimes be characterised as the foreseeable outcomes of 
economic processes and arrangements (e.g. through insufficient entitlement) 
and the ways in which economic outcomes, process and arrangements are 
alterable and remediable (e.g. through the introduction of human rights 
protections and public policy).10 
 
1.2  Towards a broader characterisation of fundamental freedoms and 
human rights 
The exclusively negative approach to fundamental freedoms and human rights 
has by now been widely challenged and this has resulted in the emergence of 
influential theories in the liberal tradition that give greater weight to poverty, 
hunger and starvation. The deconstruction of the logical distinctions between 
negative and positive freedom, and negative and positive rights, has precipitated 
important shifts – away from an exclusively negative approach, towards 
attention on autonomy, opportunity and a broader range of obstacles or 
constraints.11 An important body of theories has emerged from within the 
liberal tradition that suggests that impartiality in ethics is compatible with the 
idea of general means to freedom that all people have reasons to value, 
whatever their conceptions of the human good or human goods, or their 
particular ends and goals12 and many theories support the elucidation of far-
                                                     
10  Pogge’s (2003) ‘broad’ but negative theory of human rights also seems to build on the 
analytical space made by this idea. He contends that it is possible to go beyond the 
libertarianism without denying its central tenet (that human rights entail only negative 
obligations) by establishing that social institutions have a causal role in generating 
insecure access to the objects of human rights. Fundamental freedoms and human 
rights can then be viewed as giving rise to negative obligations of individuals and 
collective agents to refrain from supporting such institutions, with failure to respect 
negative obligations being viewed not merely in terms of the failure to assist and aid 
those who are in desperate need, but as being responsible for the generation and 
persistence of poverty. For further discussions of the distinctions between Pogge and 
Sen’s approach, see Vizard (forthcoming, Chapters 2 and 3). 
11  E.g. MacCallum (1973 [1967]) deconstructs the logical distinctions between negative 
and positive freedom and develops a single triadic formulation; Taylor (1985a, 192 & 
195) argues that all rights-based claims entail an explicit or implicit affirmation of the 
value of certain human goods; and Gewirth maintains that both negative and positive 
rights can be captured in terms of a single formula: ‘A has a right to X against B in 
virtue of Y’ (1978). For an autonomy-based characterisation of individual freedom, 
see Raz (1986).  
12  Plant (1991, 248-251) distinguishes between ‘maximalist’ approaches (that 
characterize positive freedom in terms of the realization of particular ends and goals) 
and ‘minimalist’ approaches (based on the idea of general means to freedom that all 
people have reason to value). ‘Minimalist’ approaches avoid the need for elaborated 
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reaching positive obligations — including positive obligations in the field of 
poverty, hunger and starvation. Nevertheless, when viewed from the perspective 
of the justification and elucidation of authoritatively recognized international 
standards in the field of poverty and human rights, influential theories including 
Rawls (1973, 1993, 1999, 2001) and O’Neill (1986, 1993, 1996) have important 
limitations. 
 
The Rawlsian framework and the idea of all-purpose general goods  
Rawls (1973, 1993) highlights the centrality of a person’s real opportunity to 
pursue his or her objectives to ethical evaluation and characterises primary 
goods as end-independent means to freedom (such as rights, liberties, 
opportunities and self-respect) that rational people can be assumed to want and 
that constitute the core of an ‘overlapping consensus’ on the meaning of 
‘citizen’s needs’ (and of ‘rational advantage’) under conditions of value 
pluralism. The principles of justice as fairness aim (1) to equalize the basic 
liberties enjoyed by all people; (2) to maximise the value of the equal basic 
liberties of the least advantaged by regulating inequalities in primary goods 
according to the ‘difference principle’.13 This framework provides a basis for a 
more sensitive handling of poverty, hunger and starvation but nevertheless has 
important limitations vis-à-vis the justification and elucidation of international 
standards in the field of poverty and human rights. For example, whilst making 
space for the concept of primary goods, these principles provide an inadequate 
basis for the development of a theory of economic and social rights. The 
liberties incorporated in the first principle of justice focus on a limited set of 
civil and political rights; the lexicographic ordering of the two principles appear 
to give absolute priority given to the basic liberties recognised in the first 
                                                                                                                                                                     
conceptions of the human good (or goods) and only require general judgments about 
the needs, desires, capacities, opportunities and resources that are of fundamental 
importance.  
13  Primary goods are specified as a) basic rights and liberties; b) freedom of movement 
and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities; c)powers 
and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility in the political and 
economics institutions of the basic structure; d)income and wealth e) the social bases 
of self-respect (Rawls, 1993, 181). The equal basic liberties in the first principle of 
justice are specified as: (a) freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; (b) the 
political liberties and freedom of association, as well as the freedoms specified by the 
liberty and integrity of the person; (c) the rights and liberties covered by the rule of 
law. The principles of justice as fairness are 1) each person has an equal right to a 
fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar 
scheme of liberties for all; b) social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two 
conditions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged members of society (Rawls, 1993, 291). 
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principle over all other needs when conflicts arise;14 and the distinction between 
the constituent elements of liberty and the value of liberty seems to preclude the 
admissibility of poverty, hunger and starvation as freedom restricting 
conditions.15 In addition, the principles of justice as fairness provide an 
inadequate basis for the development of a theory of human rights as universal 
benefits that all people everywhere should enjoy. The scope of the hypothetical 
choice situation is specified in terms of the domestic arrangements of a liberal 
democracy; whilst the characterisation of the principles of justice as fairness as 
universal principles with international scope is explicitly rejected.  
 
The extended framework set out in Rawls (1999, 2001) addresses these 
limitations and moves forward in four important ways. Rawl’s (1999) 
consideration of the normative principles of international relations provides for 
(1) direct consideration of universal human rights as the objects of rational 
choice behind the hypothetical ‘veil of ignorance’; (2) an explicit 
acknowledgment that a list of ‘basic’ or ‘fundamental’ rights should include 
certain minimum economic benefits.16 Rawls (2001, 48, 176) suggests (3) a 
broader first principle of justice as fairness that can accommodate minimum 
subsistence rights17 and (4) the need to supplement a ‘primary goods’ index 
with information relating to individual outcomes (e.g. health inequalities). 
Nevertheless, the treatment of human rights and socio-economic minima in the 
modified and extended Rawlsian framework remains limited in important 
respects. Whereas in the domestic context the objects of choice are specified in 
terms of alternative principles of justice, the (1999) model limits the objects of 
choice to alternative interpretations of the ‘Law of Peoples’. This specification 
                                                     
14  But see f.n. 27. 
15  ‘The inability to take advantage of one’s rights and opportunities as a result of poverty 
and ignorance, and a lack of means generally, is sometimes counted among the 
constraints definitive of liberty. I shall not, however, say this, but rather I shall be 
thinking of these things as affecting the worth of liberty, the value to individuals of 
the rights that the first principle defines’ (Rawls, 1973, 204).  
16  Shue (1980) and Vincent (1986) ‘interpret subsistence as including minimum 
economic security, and both hold subsistence rights as basic. I agree, since the 
sensible and rational exercise of all liberties, of whatever kind, as well as the 
intelligent use of property, always implies having general all-purpose economic 
means’ (Rawls, 1999, 65, f.n. 1).  
17  The first principle deals with ‘constitutional essentials’ and ‘a social minimum 
providing for the basic needs of all citizens is also a constitutional essential’ (2001, 
48). Rawls also suggests that a social minimum a logical implication of the difference 
principle, which is now taken as violated ‘when that minimum is not guaranteed’ 
(2001, 162). However, the difference principle is not itself taken to be a 
‘constitutional essential’ (2001, 48). For further elaboration, see (2001, 26-130). 
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fails to make analytical space for ‘universal primary goods’ or for a ‘global 
difference principle’ and results in a different specification of basic rights in the 
domestic and international context.18 In addition, the broadening of the first 
principle of justice in Rawls (2001) accommodates minimum subsistence rights 
but not a broader list of economic and social rights. Constitutional entrenchment 
of the ‘difference principle’ is treated as ‘non-essential’ and critical aspects of 
the regulation inequality (e.g. access to basic health for all) are to be dealt with 
‘at the legislative’ rather than the ‘Constitutional’ stage (176, 2001; 1993, 49, 
1999). Finally, notwithstanding the explicit acknowledgement that the right to 
life ‘entails’ the right to subsistence, Articles 22-28 (i.e. the entire cluster of 
social and economic rights) are excluded from Rawl’s list of human rights 
‘proper’.19 
 
O’Neill on the establishment of ‘universal positive obligations’ to assist those in 
need  
O’Neill (1986, 1989, 1993, 1996) departs from the libertarian position by 
making analytical space for the concept of positive obligation, and suggesting 
that people have far-reaching positive obligations of assistance and aid – 
including far-reaching positive obligations to relieve poverty, hunger and 
starvation. In sharp contrast to the libertarian interpretation of the ‘condition of 
universalization’ discussed in section 1.1, O’Neill builds on the ways in which 
Kant applied the concept of the ‘universal law’ to the establishment of 
‘universal principles of positive obligation’ as well as ‘universal principles of 
negative obligation’. Kant’s ethical framework creates analytical space for 
positive obligations to assist those in need by emphasising the importance of a 
class of obligations that relate not to the duty to perform or not to perform 
specific actions or types of action, but rather to duties to promote types of ‘end-
of-action’ (general policies or goals). Even where a specific action or type of 
action cannot be consistently and uniformly performed in respect to all others (a 
requirement of the interpretation of the ‘condition of universalization’ set out in 
section (1.1), Kant suggested that positive obligations to promote ‘ends-of-
action’ can be established as ‘universal imperfect obligation’ under Kant’s 
‘universal law’.20 However, in reviving the concepts of ‘universal perfect 
                                                     
18  This issue is discussed extensively in Hayden (2002).  
19  The list of human rights ‘proper’ set out in Rawls (1999, 78-85) is limited to Articles 
3-18 of the Universal Declaration (and logical implications of these human rights (e.g. 
the rights recognised in the Conventions on Genocide and Apartheid). This set is 
exclusive of Article 1 (the underlying premise of freedom and equality), Article 2 
(non-discrimination), Articles 19-20 (freedom of opinion, expression, association, 
peaceful assembly and association) and Article 21 (political participation). Article 1 is 
excluded on the grounds that they are purely aspirational; other Articles are excluded 
on the grounds that they presuppose specific institutions. 
20  Kant refers to (1) the traditional distinction between perfect duties (where no 
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obligation’ and ‘universal imperfect obligation’, and exploring their relevance 
for contemporary ethics, O’Neill also follows Kant in limiting the reach of a 
theory of fundamental or human rights to the domain of ‘universal perfect 
obligation’. Whilst making analytical space for welfare rights as ‘universally 
distributed rights’, O’Neill disputes the idea that ‘imperfect obligations’ can be 
associated with strict duties and counterparty rights. She contends that whereas 
‘perfect obligations’ (relating to the performance of specific actions) can be 
adequately reflected in a rights-based ethical framework, ‘imperfect obligations’ 
(relating to the promotion of general goals) will be ‘unallocated’ and 
‘neglected’ – and that general obligations to relieve poverty, hunger and 
starvation ‘can at best have subordinate status in an ethical system in which the 
concept of rights is fundamental’ (1996, 127-8). This position is reflected in the 
typology of obligations set out in O’Neill (1996, 152), which seems to preclude 
the admissibility of positive conceptions of ‘freedom from severe poverty’, 
‘freedom from hunger’ and ‘freedom from starvation’ as abstract, moral or pre-
institutional rights, in terms of terms of which systems of positive law and 
institutional arrangements are to be justified and judged. 
 
1.3   Sen’s contributions to the debate  
There have been various attempts in the literature to modify the Rawlsian 
framework in order to develop a more adequate basis for conceptualising 
internationally recognised standards in the field of poverty and human rights. 
These include proposals for (i) broadening the first principle of justice to 
include social and economic rights; (ii) broadening the scope of the second 
principle of justice by (iii) constructing a ‘global’ original position in which (iv) 
a ‘global difference principle’ applies.21 Sen’s critique of the characterisation of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
exceptions are permitted) and imperfect duties (giving latitude for choice) in terms of 
(2) the distinction between narrow duties (that have as their ground a specific action) 
and broad duties (that have as their ground a maxim (or ‘end of action’). For 
example, in his treatment of the obligation of beneficence, Kant maintains that since it 
is non-feasible for a single person to assist all needy people in a consistent way, there 
can be no rational (contradiction-free) principle that can prescribe the extent to which 
an individual should act to assist those in need in any particular situation. Hence the 
injunction ‘assist those in need’ cannot be universalised in terms of a duty to perform 
a particular action. However, Kant maintains that this injunction can be consistently 
willed as a maxim in respect of all others, and that, in this form, it gives rise to a 
prescriptively binding obligation under the ‘universal law’. This possibility of 
obligations that relate to the promotion of general goals – rather than to the 
performance of specific actions – gives rise to the concept of an ‘imperfect 
obligation’. Kant provides for ‘permitted limitations’ of obligations of this type when 
goal-fulfilments are not mutually co-possible (ensuring ‘intrinsic compatibility’ and 
the satisfaction of the logical principle ‘ought implies can’) (Kant 1991 [1785] 31 & 
f.n.57.1; 1991 [1797] (1996 [1797]: 168). 
21  The general possibility of conceiving basic human rights as terms of agreement that 
rational actors would choose in the original position is analysed in Hayden (2002, 
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goods in the Rawlsian framework has been a key influence both on the 
modifications and extensions to the original scheme set out by Rawls himself 
and on this broader debate. In Sen’s view, focussing on ‘primary goods’ can 
result in indifference to, and neglect of, the actual things that people can and do 
achieve. The relationship between access to ‘primary goods’ and the things that 
people can do and be is contingent and conditional, and can vary between 
individuals, families and population goods. Therefore, there is a need to move 
beyond ‘primary goods’ as an informational focus for evaluative exercises 
concerning basic human interests, and to focus directly on the substantive 
freedoms that people can and do enjoy.22 
 
1.3.1  SUPPORT FOR A BROAD CLASS OF FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS FOCUSSING ON THE VALUABLE THINGS THAT PEOPLE CAN DO AND BE 
The ‘capability approach’ departs from other frameworks by providing direct 
support for a broad characterisation of fundamental freedoms and human rights 
that takes account of poverty, hunger and starvation. In moving beyond the 
Rawlsian position, Sen has argued that individual substantive freedoms in the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
120-179). He argues that the theories set out in Rawls (1973, 1993, 1999) cannot 
support a genuinely universal human rights project and focuses on the necessity of 
types of modifications to the Rawlsian scheme. These are: (1) modifications of the 
first principle to incorporate a broader characterisation of basic rights reflecting not 
only the civil and political rights but also clearer articulation of economic and social 
rights; (2) broadening the scope of the problem addressed in the first formulation of 
the original position to accommodate universal human rights in the global context. 
Other proposals fall within the scope of this analysis. For example, Gewirth (1982, 
1996) develops a theory of primary goods in terms of the necessary conditions for 
moral agency and places this idea at the center of a broad theory of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights; Beitz (1999 [1979], 125-169) contends that if social 
cooperation is the foundation of domestic distributive justice then international 
economic interdependence is the foundation for global distributive justice. Pogge 
(1989, 272) suggests that a ‘globalized’ first principle might require a set of basic 
rights and liberties ‘analogous to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’. See 
Hayden (2002, 198-206) for fuller references to the broader literature. For more 
general criticisms of contractarianism (individualistic/non-contextual focus, 
idealistic/unrealistic premises etc.) see, for example, Sandel (1984), O’Neill (1997) 
and Nussbaum (2003). 
22  Sen’s empirical research suggests that even such elementary freedoms as the 
capability to be well nourished may vary greatly, despite the consumption of same 
amounts of food, depending on the person’s metabolic rate, body size, climatic 
conditions, parasitic disease, age, gender and special needs such as pregnancy (1993e, 
532). Rawls accepts that capabilities are more fundamental for people than primary 
goods but questions the practical feasibility of information about capabilities as 
oppose to primary goods. He suggests that, by embedding primary goods rather than 
capabilities in principles of justice, ‘we may come as close as we can in practice to a 
just distribution of Sen’s effective freedoms’ (1999, 13n; 1996, 182 185).  
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form of the capabilities and functionings23 that people can and do achieve can 
be incorporated into ethical evaluation and included among the constituent 
elements of human freedom without losing objectivity. The central class of 
‘capability freedoms’ focuses on the set of valuable things that a person is able 
to do and be. This class provides an elucidation of the ‘opportunity aspect’ of 
freedom. The ‘capability perspective’ does not provide an adequate or complete 
basis for a theory of fundamental freedoms and human rights, but rather 
provides an elucidation of the second part of Rawls second principle of justice 
(with ‘rational advantage’ characterised in terms of capability to function rather 
than primary goods).24 The central idea of ‘capability-freedom’ is then 
associated in Sen’s conceptual framework with derivate classes of ‘capability-
rights’ and obligations that have as their object the protection and promotion of 
valuable states of being and doing. In this way, the tripartite relationship 
between freedoms, rights and obligations that characterises many ethical and 
political theories (Diagrams abc) is mediated in Sen’s conceptual framework by 
the idea of capability (Diagram d). This approach supports the valuation of both 
negative and positive freedoms (Diagram e) and the elucidation of a class of 
fundamental freedoms and human rights that focuses on the valuable things that 
people can do and be (Diagram f). Unlike many other influential theories, the 
‘capability approach’ provides direct support for the characterisation of poverty, 
hunger and starvation as ‘freedom-restricting’ conditions. For example, if a 
person (x) has reasons to value a life without hunger and would choose such a 
life, then the capability of this person to achieve adequate nutrition is directly 
relevant to her real opportunity to promote her objectives and expands her 
freedom. Conversely, deprivation in the capability to achieve adequate nutrition 
restricts x’s real opportunity to promote her objectives, and is admissible as a 
‘freedom restricting’ condition. In this way: ‘Minimal demands of well-being 
(in the form of basic functionings, e.g. not to be hungry), and of well-being 
                                                     
23  The term ‘functioning’ refers to aspects of the states of being and doing that a person 
achieves, ranging from elementary personal states (such as achieving adequate 
nutrition) to complex personal states and activities (such as participation and 
appearing without shame). The term ‘capability’ refers to the alternative combinations 
of functionings that are within a person’s reach. See, for example, Sen (1993a, 31). 
24  Sen characterizes freedom as a complex and pluralist concept involving both 
opportunity and process (e.g. 2002, 9-13). In clarifying the role of the capability 
perspective in an over-all theory of fundamental freedoms and human rights, Sen has 
argued that the concept of the capability to function can be understood as an 
elucidation of the idea of the substantive freedom or real opportunity of a person to 
choose a life that he or she has reason to value. The ‘capability perspective’ provides 
an alternative specification of the second part of Rawl’s second principle of justice by 
making allowance for parametric variability between access to primary goods and the 
conversion of primary goods into valuable ends (in the form of combinations of 
valuable capabilities and functionings that people can and do achieve) (2004, 9-10). 
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freedom (in the form of minimal capabilities, e.g. having the means of avoiding 
hunger)’ can be conceptualised as rights that ‘command attention and call for 
support’ (Sen 1982a 4-7/15-19; 1985a, 217; 1985b, 21-24; 1992a, 66-8; 1993a; 
1999a,13-35/54-86). 
 
 
BOX 4 
CONCEPTUALISING HUMAN RIGHTS AND CORRELATIVE 
OBLIGATIONS IN THE ‘CAPABILITY FRAMEWORK’ 
 
THE TRIPARTITE RELATIONSHP BETWEEN FREEDOMS, RIGHTS AND 
OBLIGATIONS 
 
a) THE BASIC RELATIONSHIP
FREEDOMS
•
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
b) NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE DIMENSIONS
NEGATIVE/POSITIVE
FREEDOMS
NEGATIVE/POSITIVE NEGATIVE/POSITIVE 
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
c) FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
FUNDAMENTAL 
FREEDOMS
HUMAN 
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
 
 
 
THE ‘CAPABILITY FRAMEWORK’ 
 
d) THE CAPABILITY FRAMEWORK
FREEDOMS
BASIC CAPABILITIES
Valuable and central things a
person can do/be)
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
e) THE CAPABILITY FRAMEWORK – NEGATIVE AND 
POSITIVE DIMENSIONS
NEGATIVE + POSITIVE 
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
BASIC CAPABILITIES
(Valuable and central things a
person can do/be) 
NEGATIVE NEGATIVE  
+ POSITIVE + POSITIVE
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
f) THE CAPABILITY FRAMEWORK, FUNDAMENTAL 
FREEDOMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
NEGATIVE + POSITIVE 
FREEDOMS
BASIC CAPABILITIES
Valuable and central things a
person can do/be)
HUMAN 
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
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1.3.2  SUPPORT FOR A ‘NON-ABSOLUTIST’ MODEL THAT IS SENSITIVE TO 
CONSEQUENCES, OUTCOMES AND RESULTS 
The ‘capability approach’ also departs from other influential theories by 
providing a ‘non-absolutist’ model of fundamental freedoms and human rights 
that is sensitive to consequences, outcomes and results. The discussion in 
section 1.1 explored the ways in which ‘absolutist’ models attribute little or no 
role to consequences in ethical evaluation and suggest that fundamental 
freedoms and human rights should always take strict priority over other goals 
when there are conflicts. For example, in the Nozickian model, the set of 
libertarian rights (including rights to life, liberty and property) takes strict 
priority over other goals, with individual rights being characterised as 
constraints on individual action that are non-contingent (in the sense of 
applying in all circumstances), unqualified (in the sense that their violation is 
always wrong), and absolute. Sen has set out a far-reaching critique of this 
approach in the context of poverty, hunger and famines. The libertarian 
specification of individual rights implies that endemic hunger and famines can 
arise with no violation of acknowledged rights, whilst ‘consequence-
independent’ ethical reasoning results in ‘indifference’ to consequences such as 
malnutrition and starvation. For these reasons, Sen has proposed that the 
achievement of fundamental freedoms and human rights be evaluated in 
consequence-ethical systems that incorporate information about outcomes and 
results and of other forms of ‘complex multilateral interdependences’ involved 
in valuing fundamental freedoms and human rights in a society.25 This broader 
informational base provides support for justified limitations on fundamental 
freedoms and human rights when there are sufficiently strong reasons (e.g. the 
                                                     
25  Sen has argued that outcomes and results such as the states of being and doing that 
people achieve in practice have consequential relevance for the evaluation of 
fundamental freedoms and human rights — including relevance for the specification 
of the list of fundamental or basic rights. The ‘capability approach’ facilitates this 
approach by taking note of the correspondence between (1) the valuable states of 
being and doing that are protected and promoted in formal guarantees of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights; (2) the results that people can actually achieve (i.e. the 
capabilities that are within a person’s reach); and (3) the results that people do 
actually achieve (i.e. a person’s realized functionings). For example, in analysing the 
human right to education, the perspectives of substantive freedom recognises that 
formal guarantees of the human right to education may be systematically unrealized in 
countries where customary practice, choice inhibition and/or adaptive expectations 
militate against school attendance by girls [Sen (2002, 632-651), Nussbaum (2000, 
135-147)]. In pursuing this approach, Sen has argued that even when rights-based 
evaluations do not make explicit reference to outcomes and results they are often in 
reality based on consequence-sensitive analysis. For example, a general prohibition on 
smoking might refer only to a prohibition on actions. However, such a ban is in reality 
introduced as a means of avoiding a particular outcome (i.e. passive smoking) (1992b, 
36). 
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limitation of property rights in order to prevent a famine). Furthermore, 
absolutist models can only provide support for a limited range of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights that are in logical terms ‘co-possible’ — with the 
feasibility of ‘complete realization’ being a condition of the admissibility of 
rights-based claims. In contrast, the ‘non-absolutist’ model recognises the 
possibility of mutual conflicts and incompatibilities between fundamental 
freedoms and human rights. This broadens the scope of human rights-based 
claims by supporting the admissibility of fundamental freedoms and human 
rights that are limited by resources and other cost and feasibility constraints, and 
by accommodating the possibility of hierarchies, balancing and trade-offs 
[1982a, 4-7 & 15-19 & 38-39; 1984, 310-315; 1985a, 212-221; 1985b; 1987b, 
70-78; 1999a, 66; 2000ab].26 
 
1.3.3  STRENGTHENED SUPPORT FOR POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS OF ASSISTANCE AND 
AID 
Does an act of commission (e.g. killing someone) have the same moral weight 
as an act of omission (e.g. failing to prevent a death)? Does a murder carry the 
same moral blame as the failure to intervene to rescue a drowning person, or 
failing to take actions that would prevent starvation? The conventional 
treatment of these questions (‘the doctrine of acts and omissions’) suggests that 
people are responsible for the harm caused by their positive acts, but not for the 
harm caused by their omissions. This approach results in the delineation of a 
relatively narrow sphere of strict human responsibility — with a broader sphere 
of benevolence, charity and supererogatory action. However, the moral 
distinction between acts and omissions is blurred if account is taken of the harm 
                                                     
26  The absolutism of the outcome-independent approach is weakened in the Rawlsian 
framework in a number of important respects. First, the Rawlsian framework narrows 
the set of individual rights that take absolute priority over the fulfilment of basic 
needs to the set of basic liberties. Second, although the right to property is included, 
Rawls rejects broad interpretations, suggesting that the role of this liberty is ‘to allow 
a sufficient material basis for a sense of personal independence and self-respect’ 
(1993, 298). Third, Rawls does not characterise the basic liberties themselves in 
absolutist terms. He acknowledges that the basic liberties might conflict with one 
another and distinguishes between the ‘restriction’ of the basic liberties from 
‘regulation’ when combined into a coherent scheme (1993, 294-5). Finally, despite 
emphasis on the priority of liberty and the lexicographic principle, Rawls (1999, 297) 
concedes that the priority of liberty is not required under all conditions, depending, 
for example, on the level of economic development. Nevertheless, Sen has challenged 
the proposition that the Rawlsian basic liberties should take absolute priority over the 
fulfilment of basic needs in all circumstances. He maintains that the force of other 
considerations (including the intensity of economic needs) can challenge the ‘absolute 
priority’ of personal liberties when there are conflicts (1999a, 63-4) whilst 
nevertheless defending the separation of basic liberties for special treatment and the 
importance of motivation and intentionality in the attribution of responsibility for 
states of affairs (2003). 
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caused by intentional omissions; by foreseeable as well as intentional acts; and 
by double-effects and other consequences (e.g. Glover (1990) and Reeder 
(1996)). Furthermore, the moral distinction between acts and omissions has 
been criticised in the literature for legitimising ‘moral indifference’ towards 
harm and suffering and a ‘casual approach’ to deprivation, malnutrition and the 
lack of access to medical care (Glover, 1990, 108). The analysis of these 
limitations has given rise to increased support for the concept of positive 
obligation in relation to preventive action and the provision of life-saving 
assistance and aid, at both the individual and societal levels. In contributing to 
this debate, Sen has argued that the ‘capability approach’ provides grounds for 
far-reaching positive obligations of assistance and aid, as well as negative 
obligations of omission and restraint. The valuation of ‘capability freedoms’ 
gives rise to associated claims on others to respect ‘capability freedoms’ 
(through non-interference) and to defend and support ‘capability freedoms’ 
(through positive acts of assistance and aid). 
 
The Characterisation of Human Rights As ‘Goals’ 
In taking these ideas forward, Sen has argued that the greatest support for the 
elucidation of positive obligations of assistance and aid — including positive 
obligations to relieve poverty, hunger and starvation — may arise in moral 
structures that are ‘consequentialist but not welfarist’ (1982d, 358). If rights are 
purely instrumental (e.g. as in the utilitarian moral approach) then there is no 
case for including the realization of rights in the specification of the 
fundamental objectives of a system. If on the other hand rights are viewed as 
fundamental, but are characterised in terms of negative libertarian constraints 
(as in the Nozickian framework), then individuals can pursue their self-interest 
within the system of negative constraints, but are not under positive obligations 
to pursue the goal of the maximisation of rights-fulfilments or the minimisation 
of rights-violations. In contrast, Sen contends that if ‘consequence-sensitive’ 
reasoning is adopted without the additional limitations imposed by welfarism 
(i.e. if non-utility features including the intrinsic value of rights are treated as 
fundamental), then human rights can be included among the goals of a 
‘consequence-sensitive’ ethical system, with the achievement and non-
achievement of human rights being reflected in the positive and negative 
evaluation of states of affairs.27 This linking of the objective of ‘goal-
                                                     
27  Consequential approaches to rights-based analysis have been criticised in various 
ways in the literature. Sen has attempted to deal with many of the criticisms and 
maintains that ‘consequence-sensitive’ frameworks can combine the advantages of 
consequential reasoning (including the accommodation of interdependences, trade-
offs and instrumental accounting) with intrinsic valuation, agent sensitivity and 
position relativity in ethical assessment. He contrasts frameworks of this type with 
forms of ‘narrow consequentialist welfarism’ adopted in standard welfare economics 
and with deontological approaches adopted in ethics (1982a, 1983a, 1987b, 74-78, 
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realizations’ to moral obligations through ‘consequence-sensitive’ links can 
strengthen the role of ethical considerations in individual behaviour — 
including the positive obligations on third parties who are in a position to help 
[(1982a, 3-20 & 38-39), (1985a, 217), (1985b, 14-19), (1987b, 56-57 & 70-78)].  
 
1.3.4  SUPPORT FOR THE VALIDITY OF A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF ‘IMPERFECT OBLIGATIONS’ 
The characterisation of rights as goals also breaks down the emphasis in some 
theories on a binary correspondence between rights-fulfilments (and violations) 
and the performance (and non-performance) of specific duties or actions, and 
emphasises instead the tripartite relationship between agents, goals (or 
outcomes) to which that agent has rights, and the associated obligations and 
duties (1982a, 38; 1982d, 347; 1985c).28 This challenges theories that make 
analytical space for the concept of positive obligation — but that maintain that, 
in the field of poverty, hunger and starvation, positive obligations are not 
associated with counter-party human rights. In responding to O’Neill, Sen has 
argued that the introduction of ‘consequence-sensitive’ reasoning provides a 
framework in which the value of human rights achievements and the disvalue of 
non-realizations can be reflected in the evaluation of states of affairs. This 
evaluation is not contingent on the precise specification duties or on legal 
codification, and in Sen’s view, the ‘consequence-sensitive’ approach provides 
a basis for the conceptualisation of human rights that correspond to ‘imperfect’ 
as well as ‘perfect’ obligations (Sen 1981b; 1982a, 2-20 & 38-39; 1984, 310-
315; 1985a, 212-221; 1985b, 14-19; 1987b, 56-57&70-78; 2000ab).29 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1993d). However, a classic objection — the question of whether the duties that flow 
from positive obligations are necessarily ‘indeterminate’ or are only ‘weakly 
determined’ in consequential frameworks — is not fully resolved. As Sen 
acknowledges, the issue of who in particular is responsible for fulfilling a right, and 
how far they are obliged to go in fulfilling the right — is left open (2000a, 494-5). 
28  The general class of rights that focus on outcomes rather than on permissions and 
obligations to act (or not to act) is discussed in Sen (2002, 645) and referred to as the 
class of ‘contingent rights to ‘states of affairs’’. 
29  Nussbaum characterizes basic capabilities as needs for functioning and proposes that 
the gap between the potential capability for a good human life, and the full realization 
of such a life, gives rise to claims of assistance by others and provides a rationale for 
theories of political obligation and human rights. See, for example, (1993, 1997). 
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1.3.5  SUPPORT FOR POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES AIMED AT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF 
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Whereas the Nozickian model makes the feasibility of ‘complete realization’ a 
condition of the admissibility of rights-based claims, Sen has argued that 
feasibility cannot be a condition of coherence, and that fundamental freedoms 
and human rights based claims can be meaningful in the context of cost and 
feasibility-constraints. Sen has reasoned that where there are resource 
constraints, the positive obligations associated with ‘capability-freedoms’ and 
‘capability-rights’ may not relate directly to valuable states of being and doing 
(x) — that may be currently unachievable — but to policies and programmes 
p(x) that promote the achievement of (x) as an immediate or cumulative 
outcome. The violation of obligations of this type involves the absence and 
inadequacy of policies and programmes p(x) — rather than the non-fulfilment 
of (x) per se (Sen, 1982d; 2000a). This approach is reflective of a critical 
element in the establishment and development of international legal obligation 
in the field of poverty and human rights. For example, Articles 26-29 of the Bill 
of Rights attached to the South African Constitution (1996) entrenches a cluster 
of socio-economic rights essential for an adequate standard of living — 
including the human rights to housing, access to health care, sufficient food and 
water, social security and education. The justiciability and legally enforceability 
of these human rights has been put beyond question by jurisprudence of the 
South African Constitutional Court, which has upheld claims for the violation of 
socio-economic rights in a series of landmark judgements.30 These Cases 
establish that resource constraints do not relieve the Government of the positive 
obligation to fulfil the socio-economic rights established in Articles 26-29 of the 
Constitution by taking positive measures to eliminate or reduce the large areas 
of severe deprivation that afflict South Africa.31 However, the Court has also 
sought to delimit the nature and scope of the duties that flow from this positive 
obligation. It has reasoned that the Governments responsibilities under these 
                                                     
30  See Articles 26-29 of the Bill of Rights attached to the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa [Act 108 of 1996] www.concourt.gov.za. Cases considered include 
Grootboom v Government of the Republic of South Africa (housing) and Treatment 
Action Campaign (TAC) v The Minister of Health (medical care), Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, Judgments dated 4 October 2000 and 5 July 2002 
www.concourt.gov.za. 
31  ‘[H]undreds of thousands of people [are] living in deplorable conditions throughout 
the country. The Constitution obliges the State to act positively to ameliorate these 
conditions. The obligation is to provide access to housing, health-care, sufficient food 
and water, and social security to those unable to support themselves and their 
dependents …[Although it] is an extremely difficult task for the State to meet these 
obligations in the conditions that prevail in our country... [T]hese are rights, and the 
Constitution obliges the State to give effect to them. This is an obligation that Courts 
can and in appropriate circumstances, must enforce’ [Gootbroom paras. 93-4]. 
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Articles can be discharged through the adoption of policies and programmes 
that aim at the achievement of human rights over time rather than their 
immediate and/or complete fulfilment.32 
 
1.3.6  SUPPORT FOR UNIVERSALISM AGAINST THE RELATIVIST AND CULTURE-
BASED CRITIQUES 
Finally, Sen’s work in ethics has pushed the human rights agenda forward by 
defending the idea of universalism against the relativist and culture-based 
critiques. In rejecting approaches that locate the historical antecedents of 
contemporary ideas about fundamental freedoms and human rights exclusively 
in Western traditions of natural law and natural rights, Sen has both subjected 
the idea of a monolithic Asian culture that is opposed to fundamental freedoms 
and human rights to critical scrutiny, and has defended the relevance of diverse 
cultures, religions and philosophies to the development of these ideas. In 
particular, he has argued that:  
 
? All societies and cultures comprise diverse elements. Elements within 
Western societies, cultures and philosophies that are consistent with and 
supportive of contemporary ideas about universal human rights have co-
existed with other elements that are neither supportive nor consistent with 
the idea of human rights (e.g. slavery, sexism, racism and fascism). 
Similarly, elements in non-Western societies have co-existed with 
elements that are neither consistent with nor supportive of this idea. 
? The historical antecedents of the ideas of fundamental freedoms and 
human rights are not exclusive to particular societies, religions or 
cultures. The ideas from which contemporary concepts of human rights 
emerged — ideas of universalism, tolerance and respect for human 
dignity and worth, traditions of freedom, traditions of concern for the 
poor, needy and exploited, and traditions of interpersonal obligation and 
                                                     
32  The Court has reasoned that there are two counter-balancing elements to Articles 26-
29: a first element recognising the general right, and a second element establishing 
and delimiting the scope of the positive obligation imposed on the state. In weighing 
up these elements, the Court has reasoned that the State is not obliged (a) to go 
beyond available resources or (b) to realize the rights immediately. Rather, the State 
must (c) act reasonably to ensure the progressive realization of these rights over time. 
This can involve (d) the adoption of a comprehensive policy or programme that is 
(d.1) is capable of facilitating the realisation of the right in question and (d.2) makes 
appropriate provision for short, medium and term needs. Programmes or policies that 
exclude a significant segment of society, or that do not take adequate account of 
immediate crisis needs, cannot be said to be reasonable. In the Cases referred to 
above, the policies and programmes adopted by the government failed to comply with 
these principles and the Government was held to be in violation of the positive 
obligations established in the Constitution [Grootboom  pars. 41-44, 65-69, 95; TAC 
67-95]. 
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government responsibility — have broad historical antecedents that are 
not regionally constrained.  
? The work of non-Western thinkers (including tolerance, pluralism and 
minority protection (Ashoka) good government and famine prevention 
(Kautilya) and Akbar) should be re-appraised in the light of these 
principles.33  
 
The attempt to move beyond the universalism-relativism dichotomy by 
establishing cross-cultural foundations for the idea of human rights is reflective 
of the broader emphasis in Sen’s work on the underlying question of how to 
preserve a role for the development of universal ethical categories (capabilities, 
freedoms, human rights etc.) whilst recognising the importance of diversity and 
difference in human affairs. For example, the underlying concern with the 
reconciliation of universalism on the one hand, and diversity and difference on 
the other is central to Sen’s theoretical work on the nature of objectivity (in the 
argument that universal values can be compatible with variances associated with 
positional characteristics). Whereas standard approaches characterise 
‘neutrality’ in terms of some form of invariance with respect to individual 
observers and their positions (Nagel’s ‘view from nowhere’), Sen has suggested 
that positional characteristics may be relevant for observations, knowledge, 
beliefs, practical reasons and choices and that this parametric dependence can 
be built into the evaluation of states of affairs without compromising 
objectivity. Hence in Sen’s view, ‘neutrality’ is compatible with ‘position-
relativity’ when the observational position is variable — requiring only that 
evaluators in identical positions would adopt identical evaluations.34 The 
possibility of developing universal ethical categories in the context of diversity 
and difference is also reflected in Sen’s emphasis on ‘second-order 
justifications’;35 in challenges to completeness as a condition of ethical 
evaluation (with practical proposals for applying the ideas of capabilities and 
rights emphasising the limits that value pluralism may impose on the 
development of evaluative systems);36 and in practical proposals for the 
                                                     
33  See for example Sen (1997c, 35-40) and (1999a, 227-240). Also see Vizard (2000b). 
34  These positional characteristics can include a range of parametric variables including 
location and situation as well as relationship ties and a person’s special concern for 
his or her own actions See, for example, Sen (1982a, 19-38; 1983a; 1993d) and 
Anderson (2003).  
35  A second-order justification can begin with an assertion of valuable elements, and 
then seek consistency of other proposed ideas with these elements (1985c, 21-23 ).  
36  For example, in advocating the use of capability-space (as oppose to utility-space or 
income-space) for evaluative exercises concerning basic human interests, Sen has 
argued that the capability approach is consistent and combinable with several 
different substantive theories of value and that there is no theoretical necessity for the 
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assessment of poverty (in the argument that an invariance in capability and 
functioning may correspond to a variance in commodity space).37  
 
2. Sen’s Contributions in Economics 
This second part of the paper turns to the ground-breaking ways in which Sen’s 
research agenda has focussed international attention on the critical importance 
of fundamental freedoms and human rights for economic analysis. In the past, 
the idea of fundamental freedoms and human rights has often been neglected in 
theoretical and empirical economics. Dominant approaches have evaluated the 
adequacy of economic processes and arrangements in terms of income 
expansion, whilst standard frameworks in welfare economics have evaluated 
interpersonal advantage and the efficiency and fairness of competitive market 
outcomes in terms of utility — with no explicit recognition of instrumental and 
intrinsic value of fundamental freedoms and human rights (see Box 5). In 
contrast, Sen has set out a far-reaching critique of standard frameworks that fail 
to take account of fundamental freedoms and human rights (section 2.1), 
opening up important new lines of enquiry, and pioneering the development of 
radical new paradigms and approaches that take account of these concerns 
(sections 2.2-2.6). His contributions include far-reaching proposals for the 
incorporation of new variables and concerns into theoretical and empirical 
economics including individual entitlements (section 2.2), capabilities and 
functionings (2.3), gender discrimination (2.4), civil and political rights (2.5), 
‘freedom of choice’ and ‘opportunity freedom’ (2.6) and ‘liberty rights’ and 
‘basic rights’ (2.7). These proposals have contributed to important paradigm 
shifts — away from an exclusive concern with income, growth and utility, 
towards a range of human rights-focussed variables and concerns — and 
provide a framework for the instrumental and intrinsic valuation of fundamental 
                                                                                                                                                                     
question of relative value of different capabilities to be resolved prior to agreement on 
evaluative space (e.g.1992a 46-49 & 133-134; 1993a, 34-33 & 48-49; 1997, 203-209). 
37  In defending the proposition that ‘irreducible absolutist core’ in the idea of poverty 
against the view that relativism ‘dissolves’ the concept of absolute need, Sen has 
argued that a relativist characterisation of poverty in commodity-space may 
correspond to absolutist characterisation in the space of capabilities and functionings 
— because there may be more variation in the commodity requirements of capabilities 
than in capabilities themselves. The ‘commodity-basis’ of the ‘capability to be 
adequately nourished’ may vary greatly across communities — giving the poverty 
line in commodity-space a relative character. Similarly, the commodity requirements 
of the ‘capability to appear in public without shame’ will vary in different societies 
with different social and cultural norms, income levels, modes of production etc. 
(1984, 325-345; 1987a, 17). 
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freedoms and human rights in economic assessment and empirical economic 
research. 
 
2.1  Towards a human rights-based critique of standard economic 
frameworks 
 
The failure of standard frameworks in economics to take adequate account of 
the instrumental and intrinsic value of fundamental freedoms and human rights 
is a central and re-occurring theme in Sen’s work. His research agenda over 
more than forty years has highlighted the limitations of dominant income-
focussed and utility-focussed paradigms in theoretical and empirical economics 
from the perspective of fundamental freedoms and human rights. These 
frameworks concentrate on an overly-narrow informational base and an overly-
narrow view of the means and the ends of development and growth. Both the 
instrumental role of fundamental freedoms and human rights (in influencing the 
effectiveness of development and growth) and the intrinsic value of 
fundamental freedoms and human rights (in assessing the benefits of trajectories 
of development and growth for individuals, groups and populations) are 
neglected. 
 
BOX 5 
NEGLECT OF THE INSTRUMENTAL AND INTRINSIC ROLE OF FUNDAMENTAL 
FREEDOMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ‘STANDARD’ ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
 
Focus on income and utility 
? 
Overly narrow informational base 
? 
Overly narrow characterisation of the means and ends of development and growth 
? 
Neglect of the instrumental and intrinsic role fundamental freedoms and human 
rights in economic evaluation 
? ? 
Neglect of the instrumental role of 
fundamental freedoms and human rights 
in achieving effective development and 
growth 
Neglect of the intrinsic role of 
fundamental freedoms and human rights 
in evaluating the benefits of development 
and growth for individuals, populations 
and groups 
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The critique of ‘standard’ frameworks 
Sen’s critique of income-focussed frameworks has emphasised the finding that 
competitive market economies and trajectories of development and growth can 
generate many different outcomes and that non-income variables (including 
institutional conditions and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights) 
are among the variables that can affect these results. For example, effective 
development and growth may critically depend on a wide range of non-income 
variables such as the presence or absence of pro-poor public policies related to 
basic education, health care and employment generation and the institutional 
context in which markets function, including respect for fundamental freedoms 
and human rights (on which, see section 2.5). Income-focussed approaches 
concentrate on a particular means (or instrument), resulting in the neglect of the 
intrinsic value of ultimate objectives and goals (including the intrinsic value of 
fundamental freedoms and human rights), as well the neglect of the instrumental 
value of other (non-income) instruments. An exclusive focus on income can 
therefore result in systematic bias and policy failure because of (1) the focus on 
a single instrument when many may be relevant; (2) the focus on the ‘wrong’ 
policy target (Drèze and Sen (1989) and Sen (199a; 2001b)). In welfare 
economics, individual well-being is often characterised in terms of the concept 
of utility (understood in terms of individual ‘pleasures and pains’, happiness 
and/or desire-fulfilment) and operationalised in terms of revealed preferences 
and actual choices. Sen has developed a far-reaching critique of ‘welfarist’ 
frameworks for concentrating on an overly narrow view of human rationality 
and well-being. His work has ‘unpacked’ the ‘welfarist’ foundations of a wide-
range of conceptual and technical apparatus and has analysed the limitations of 
this informational base from the perspective of fundamental freedoms and 
human rights — for the prediction of individual behaviour, the characterisation 
of interpersonal advantage and the evaluation of the efficiency and fairness of 
competitive market outcomes. Key limitations include:  
 
? Neglect of the relevance of fundamental freedoms and human rights to 
the characterisation of human motivation and rationality and the 
prediction of individual behaviour. Standard frameworks assume (1) that 
individual utility can be interpreted in terms of the real representation of 
individual preferences (via the utility function); (2) that individual 
preferences are motivated by ‘self-interested utility maximisation’; (3) 
that individual preferences can be deduced from individual choices (the 
theory of revealed preference); (4) that ‘maximal choices’ can be equated 
with ‘optimal choices’. Sen has argued that these assumptions result in an 
overly narrow view of human motivation and rationality and can result in 
wrong predictions. The objective of individual behaviour is not 
necessarily ‘self-interested utility maximisation’ and other motivations 
and objectives may be important determinants of preferences and choices. 
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These include identity, loyalties, commitments, agency and the pursuit of 
goals and values such as fundamental freedoms and human rights.  
 
BOX 6 
EXPANDING THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS TO TAKE 
ACCOUNT OF FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
INCOME AND UTILITY V FREEDOMS AND RIGHTS 
 
 
 
 
Critique of ‘income-focussed’ 
frameworks for the evaluation of 
poverty, inequality and trajectories 
of development and growth 
 
+  
Critique of ‘welfarist’ informational 
base for the prediction of individual 
behaviour, the assessment of 
personal advantage, the evaluation 
of efficiency and fairness 
 
Importance of fundamental freedoms 
and human rights for a range of 
evaluative exercises in theoretical 
and empirical economics including 
the evaluation of (1) personal 
advantage; (2) the efficiency and 
fairness of market outcomes; (3) 
poverty and inequality; (4) the 
adequacy of public policy and 
institutional arrangements; (5) 
trajectories of development and 
growth 
 
? Neglect of the relevance of fundamental freedoms and human rights to 
the characterisation of personal and interpersonal advantage. Sen has 
argued that ‘welfarism’ is an overly narrow informational base for 
characterising personal interests because it focuses on the well-being 
aspect of a person (relating to his or her own personal physical and 
mental interests), whilst neglecting the agency aspect (relating to the 
goals that a person values, desires and has reasons to pursue); on a single 
dimension of human wellbeing (utility), whilst neglecting other 
dimensions (including entitlements, capabilities and functionings, 
opportunity, freedom and human rights); and on outcomes, whilst 
neglecting process-sensitivity and the intrinsic value of individual 
freedom of choice and participation. Furthermore, interpersonal 
comparisons based on individual ‘mental states’ such as happiness and 
desire-fulfilment may be systematically biased because of the 
phenomenon of ‘adaptive expectations’. This phenomenon may be 
particularly common in the context of inequality, poverty and oppressive 
cultural traditions — with the expectations and desires of vulnerable 
groups including the poor, and women in traditional and sexist societies 
being particularly affected — whilst the limitations of utility-based 
frameworks in the context of ‘adaptive expectations’ are exacerbated by 
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the use of choice information as a proxy for utility (via the theory of 
revealed preference).38 
? Neglect of the relevance of fundamental freedoms and human rights to 
the evaluation of the efficiency and fairness of competitive market 
outcomes. Standard approaches in welfare economics adopt utility-based 
interpretations of Pareto Optimality as a necessary condition for 
economic efficiency and distributional fairness. Sen has critiqued this 
concept on the grounds that it is ‘supremely unconcerned with 
distributional issues’. A state can be Pareto Optimal ‘with some people in 
extreme misery and others rolling in luxury, so long as the miserable 
cannot be made better off without cutting into the luxury of the rich’ 
(1987b, 31-32), (1997[1978], 7). Furthermore, the concept of Pareto 
Optimality is insensitive to the possibility of entitlement failure and 
starvation, and can conflict with respect for individual liberty-rights. 
These limitations feed into judgements about the efficiency and fairness 
of competitive market outcomes through the Fundamental Theorems of 
Welfare Economics.39 
 
The need to expand theoretical and empirical economics to take account of 
fundamental freedoms and human rights  
Against this background, Sen’s research agenda has moved both theoretical and 
empirical economics forward by highlighting the importance of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights for the analysis of economic processes and 
                                                     
38  See, for example, Sen (1985a, 15), (1987b, 45-46) and (309, 1984) and Nussbaum 
(2001). 
39  The concept of Pareto Optimality suggests that a situation is optimal if no non-
conflicting improvements can be made (i.e. if no one’s situation can be improved 
without worsening the situation of someone else). Utility-based interpretations 
suggest that a situation is optimal if no one’s utility can be improved without 
worsening the utility of someone else. The First Theorem of Welfare Economics 
establishes that under certain assumptions (e.g. no externalities) all competitive 
market equilibria are Pareto Optimal. That is, no one’s situation (utility) can be 
improved without worsening the situation (utility) of someone else, starting from any 
competitive market equilibrium. The Second Theorem establishes that given certain 
additional conditions (e.g. no convexities) every Pareto Optimal outcome is a 
competitive equilibrium with respect to some set of prices and some initial 
distribution of resources. Therefore, every Pareto Optimal outcome can be 
decentralized using the competitive market mechanism (with an appropriate initial 
allocation and price vector). Although more radical interpretations are possible, these 
Theorems are often interpreted as implying that, under certain assumptions and 
conditions, competitive market outcomes are not improvable in ways that would 
increase the utility of at least one person without reducing the utility of somebody 
else. For further discussion, see Sen (1993e) and, for example, Mas-Colell et. al. 
(1995, 556-7). 
 32
arrangements including the evaluation of (1) personal advantage (2) the 
efficiency and fairness of market outcomes (3) poverty and inequality (4) the 
adequacy of public policy and institutional arrangements (5) the nature of 
development and growth. His work has emphasised the development of new 
frameworks and approaches in theoretical and empirical economics that take 
account of both the instrumental role of fundamental freedoms and human 
rights in influencing competitive market outcomes and trajectories of 
development and growth; and of ‘post-welfarist’ frameworks in welfare 
economics that take more account of the intrinsic value of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights in assessing the impact of economic arrangements 
and processes on individuals, groups and populations. ‘Post-welfarist’ 
frameworks of this type include frameworks that adopt a pluralistic 
informational base, taking account of both well-being and agency; frameworks 
that take account of the non-utility features of human motivation and personal 
well-being; frameworks that are sensitive to processes as well as to outcomes, 
reflecting the intrinsic value of freedom of choice and participation; frameworks 
that go beyond the view of individual preferences as ‘self-interested utility 
maximisation’ by adopting a broader view of agency and the things that people 
would choose to do (given the choice); and frameworks that give a central and 
constitutive role to the value of freedoms and rights in economic analysis and 
evaluation.  
 
‘The assessment of ‘value’ has to take us well beyond utilities … 
[T]he evaluation of consequences [should take] explicit note of the 
violation and fulfilment of [freedoms and] rights … by 
incorporating the value of right fulfilment and the disvalue of 
rights violation into the assessment of resulting states of affairs’ 
(Sen 1996, 26; 1987b, 73).40 
                                                     
40  The criticisms of utilitarianism highlighted in the literature include (1) focus on utility 
information; (2) failure to give adequate weight to agent-relative values; (3) failure to 
give adequate weight to intrinsically good and bad actions; (4) failure to give intrinsic 
weight to the violation and fulfilment of individual rights (including internationally 
recognized human rights). These and other limitations are discussed in Sen and 
Williams (1982). In responding to (3), Sen has argued that the proposition that rights 
are instruments to ultimate objectives be split into the propositions that (1) rights do 
not have intrinsic importance (only a derivate role, ideally in promoting utility), and 
(2) any acknowledgement of rights — legally or morally — has consequential 
implications which must be examined. He maintains that even when (1) is rejected, 
the relevance of (2) is not disestablished. See, for example, Sen (1996b, 156). 
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Proposals for moving forward  
Sections 2.1-2.6 analyse the key ways in which Sen’s proposals have moved 
theoretical and empirical economics forward by incorporating new variables 
and concerns that reflect the intrinsic and instrumental value of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights. These contributions include far-reaching proposals 
for the incorporation of individual entitlements, capabilities and functionings, 
civil and political rights, ‘freedom of choice’, ‘liberty rights’ and ‘basic rights’ 
into economic analysis and evaluation. These proposals have contributed to 
important paradigm shifts — away from an exclusive concern with income, 
growth and utility, towards a range of human rights-focussed variables and 
concerns. They have opened-up important new lines of enquiry and provide a 
framework for the instrumental and intrinsic valuation of fundamental freedoms 
and human rights in economic assessment and in empirical economic research. 
 
 
 
 
BOX 7 
SUMMARY OF SEN’S PROPOSALS FOR THE INCLUSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
BASED CONCERNS AND VARIABLES INTO THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
EOCNOMICS  
 
• Individual Entitlements (section 2.2). Analytical framework for assessing the 
sensitivity of the ‘rights-structure’ prevailing in a particular society to poverty, 
hunger and starvation; empirical evidence of the importance of variables other 
than aggregate food supply as determinants of individual access to food.  
• Capabilities and Functionings (section 2.3). Conceptualisation of substantive 
freedoms as the primary objectives of social and economic arrangements; 
empirical evidence of the dissonance between the expansion of individual income 
and the expansion of capability achievement, evaluation of trajectories of 
development and growth in terms of capability expansion (e.g. ‘development and 
freedom’ and ‘human development’); development of approaches to poverty and 
inequality that focus on capability deprivation (e.g. poverty as ‘capability 
deprivation’ and analysis of inequalities in capability-achievement by different 
population groups (e.g. by gender, ethnicity, nationality etc.). 
• Gender Discrimination (section 2.4). Empirical investigation of gender 
discrimination in capability space and analysis of gender power asymmetries and 
the intra-household situation as cases of ‘co-operative conflict’. 
• Civil and Political Rights (section 2.5). Analysis of the instrumental role of 
individual liberties in promoting effective development and growth (e.g. role of 
civil and political rights in preventing socio-economic disasters, promoting 
transparency and providing incentives for the solution of acute economic needs.  
• ‘Freedom of Choice’ and ‘Opportunity Freedom’ (section 2.6). Proposals for 
capturing and formalising the idea of the right to choose and nature and scope of 
individual choices and constraints in economics. 
• ‘Liberty-Rights’ and ‘Basic Rights’ (section 2.7). Development of ‘social-
choice’ theoretic models of liberty rights and ‘basic’ rights. 
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2.2  Individual entitlements  
The ‘entitlement approach’ provides a framework for assessing the impact of 
the ‘rights-structure’ that prevails in a particular society on poverty, hunger and 
starvation. Whereas the concept of rights focuses on the relationship between 
two agents (two individuals, an individual and the state etc.), the concept of 
entitlement focuses on a person’s ‘command over things’, given the complete 
specification of the rights and obligations that an agent has vis-à-vis others, and 
the rights and obligations that others have vis-à-vis him. A person’s ‘entitlement 
set’ identifies the different bundles of things to which he or she has access, 
given the specification of (1) the rights-structure; (2) initial endowments, 
transfers and opportunities for transforming endowments into entitlements via 
exchange. In economies characterised by production for own consumption (e.g. 
peasant economies), the exchange mapping depends on the exchange 
relationship with nature (i.e. agricultural productivity), whereas in economies 
where a significant proportion of the population acquires food by exchanging 
labour power for a wage, markets are a crucial determinant of a person's 
‘entitlement set’. Hunger and starvation are captured and formalised in this 
model in terms of the failure to access an ‘entitlement set’ that includes a 
commodity bundle satisfying minimum food requirements. If a set of 
commodity bundles Fi satisfies the minimum food requirements of person i, 
then i will starve if he or she is not entitled to any member of Fi (given (1) the 
rights-structure; (2) endowments, transfers and exchange entitlement 
mappings). The ‘starvation set’ Si identifies allocations of endowments that are 
associated with inadequate exchange entitlements, and facilitates the distinction 
between systems of rights that give rise to legal entitlements to adequate food, 
and systems of rights that do not (e.g. Sen 1981, 1982d 347-351). 
 
Empirical applications of the ‘entitlement approach’ 
Sen’s empirical applications of the ‘entitlement approach’ have moved the 
economics and human rights agenda forward by providing new insights into the 
nature and causation of deprivation and by focussing international attention on 
the range of variables other than aggregate food supply that can help to explain 
hunger and starvation. Sen has hypothesised that ‘[m]ost cases of starvation and 
famines across the world arise not from people being deprived of things to 
which they are entitled, but from people not being entitled, in the prevailing 
legal system of institutional rights, to adequate means for survival’ (1982d, 
349). His empirical research supports this argument by suggesting that in large 
famines in the recent past, in which millions of people have died, starvation has 
occurred as a consequence of entitlement shifts resulting from the exercise of 
rights that were perfectly legitimate in legal terms. Furthermore, important 
variables other than aggregate food supply can undermine a person’s 
entitlement to food. Starvation deaths often arise when there is no overall 
decline in food availability, with entitlement failure arising, for example, when 
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particular population groups were unable to trade their labour power or skills 
(Sen 1981; also see Drèze and Sen (1989)). These research findings have helped 
to focus international attention on the importance of food security policies that 
take into account the determinants of the differential ability of individuals, 
groups and classes to command food in practice. Thus the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Right to Food has recommended that the first step in 
a national food security strategy is to map the situation for different population 
groups, taking into account a range of variables including occupation, gender, 
ethnicity, race and rural/urban location. This approach reflects the complex 
causes of starvation and hunger and importance of the precise identification of 
the food-insecure — who they are, where they are located and the particular 
causes underlying their vulnerability (Eide, 1998-9).  
 
The Human Right to Freedom from Hunger and Competitive Market Outcomes 
The ‘entitlement approach’ has also generated debates about whether famines 
can occur under conditions of perfect competition with rational behaviour. This 
debate is important for assessing what markets can and cannot achieve under the 
idealized conditions of perfect competition from the perspective of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights. Sen’s analysis suggests that there is a possibility of 
a situation in which competitive markets clear, but in which not everyone gets 
an adequate food entitlement to guarantee survival. Where individuals and 
groups have no direct food entitlements there may be non-survival, with 
insecure food entitlements arising not as a result of market failure (as this is 
standardly understood), but when markets work. This analysis challenges 
approaches that rule out the possibility of starvation death due to an inability to 
buy sufficient food through production or exchange, and/or that maintain that if 
all economic agents are rational, there will be an appropriate behavioural 
response to famines that can be anticipated (e.g. insuring against food insecurity 
by storing grain or expanding food production41). Some authors have concluded 
                                                     
41  The assumption of universal survival is embodied in the principle of trade-
independent security which implies that ‘each consumer can, if necessary, survive on 
the basis of the resources he holds and the direct use of his own labour, without 
engaging in exchange and still have something to spare of some type of labour which 
is sure to meet with a positive price in any equilibrium’ (Koopman, as cited in Sen, 
1981, 172). Desai suggests that this assumption comes about both for reasons of 
mathematical simplicity (since introducing minimum subsistence for consumers as a 
necessary condition for equilibrium would introduce discontinuities make 
mathematical proof difficult) and because of standard assumptions about scarcity in 
mainstream economics. The proposition that famines — a form of systematic and 
pervasive scarcity — can occur (and have historically occurred) without there 
necessarily being a shortage of food, and in the face of available food stocks, is 
analogous to the claim that involuntary unemployment can occur in the face of excess 
capacity and unsold commodity surpluses. Just as involuntary unemployment does not 
arise in the pure model of competitive markets, and is standardly explained in terms 
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that Sen’s empirical findings must be explainable in terms of insufficient initial 
endowments, market failure caused by the violation of the initial conditions 
and/or broader political conditions (e.g. restrictions on access to food and/or 
freedom of movement or food transportation resulting from government policy, 
violence, war etc.). Others have emphasised that freedom from starvation 
cannot be guaranteed under the idealized conditions of competition and have 
developed models that support the prediction of entitlement failures in 
economies in which competitive markets ‘work’. For example, Desai (1995 
[1990] 136-147) takes up the question of how entitlement failures in food can 
arise if there is no decline in food availability and/or no rise in the price of food, 
whilst Coles and Hammond contend that entitlement failures ‘do nothing to 
create any Pareto inefficiencies’ and ‘cannot be market failures in any normal 
sense’. 
 
‘[T]he tragedy of starvation can arise in economies characterized 
by perfect competition. Then starvation is not a result of market 
failure … [Like] involuntary unemployment … it is not the result 
either of unnecessary institutional rigidities in the labour market. 
Instead, it is an entirely natural phenomenon of a neoclassical 
economy with surplus labour. Only after excess labour has been 
removed through starvation can general equilibrium arise’ (1995, 
60).42 
 
2.3  Capabilities and functionings 
Sen’s contributions to the development of a cross-disciplinary bridge between 
economics and human rights have been driven forward by the argument that 
economic processes and arrangements should be evaluated from the perspective 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of departures from the assumptions of the pure model, so the pure model of 
competitive markets must rule out involuntary hunger and starvation (Desai, 1995 
[1987], 120-133).  
42  Desai (1995 [1990] 136-147) develops a two individual two good model covering the 
markets for rice and fish, with an asymmetric preference structure and specialisation, 
and demonstrates that famine conditions can occur without invoking market failure. 
Coles and Hammond (1995) demonstrate that standard results relating to the existence 
and efficiency of general market equilibria are valid even when the assumption of 
universal survival is relaxed. Competitive equilibria with non-survivors exist and are 
Pareto Optimal because the survival of the non-survivors would require sacrifices 
from survivors. Core equivalence also holds, with non-survivors lacking the resources 
they need to block a Walrasian equilibrium, and to ensure their own survival. Various 
modifications of the standard framework are required to establish the proofs (e.g. 
assumptions to deal with the distribution of ‘needs’ on the margin of survival and 
non-convexities in consumptions set as an individual passes between survival and 
death). 
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of individual substantive freedoms (rather than other informational focuses such 
as income and utility). This argument is reflected in a series of influential 
proposals for evaluating individual advantage, the efficiency and fairness of 
competitive market equilibria, the adequacy of public policy and institutional 
arrangements, poverty and inequality, and the nature of development and 
growth, in terms of the capabilities and functionings that people can and do 
achieve. Proposals for capturing and formalising individual substantive 
freedoms in the form of the valuable ‘beings’ and ‘doings’ in ‘capability space’ 
build on the ‘entitlement approach’ but recognise that the mapping between a 
person’s entitlements (i.e. their command over commodities) on the one hand, 
and a person’s capability to achieve valuable functionings on the other, depends 
on personal features (such as bodyweight, health status and aspects of a persons 
situation reflected in ‘environmental conditions’). ‘Capability space’ takes 
account of this parametric dependence on personal features by introducing a 
‘characteristics function’ (that governs the conversion of commodity 
consumption into valuable characteristics) and a ‘personal utilisation function’ 
(that governs the conversion of characteristics into valuable things that a person 
can do and be). The different combinations of beings and doing that i can 
achieve (such as being nourished, clothed, mobile or taking part in the life of the 
community) are captured and formalised as ‘functioning vectors’ (i.e. as 
‘points’) in ‘capability space’. Given i’s command over commodities (or 
entitlements) and his or her personal features (such as bodyweight, health status 
and aspects of their personal situation reflected in ‘environmental conditions’), 
the ‘capability set’ Qi (Xi) is defined derivatively as the set of feasible 
‘functioning vectors’ for person i, and represents the freedom that a person has 
in terms of the choice of functionings (i.e. the various combinations of doings 
and beings that he or she can feasibly achieve): 
 
. somefor  and (.) somefor  ,))(([)( iXixiFifixcifibibiXiQ ∈∈==  
 
where is a vector of commodities possessed by i 
Xi is the set of feasible commodity vectors for i 
c(.) is a function converting a commodity vector into a vector of characteristics  
fi (.) is a personal ‘utilisation function’ for i (representing the conversion of a 
commodities vector xi into a functionings vector by i) 
Fi is the set of feasible ‘utilisation functionings’ fi, for i  
and ))(( iii xcfb = is a vector of achieved functionings for person i (given a 
commodity vector xi and the choice of a utilization function fi). 
 
Since i is able or has the capability to choose a functioning vector from the set 
of feasible functioning vectors, the capability set might be interpreted as a 
possibility or opportunity set for i. Alternatively, the capability set might be 
conceptualised as representing i’s options or the extent or range of his or her 
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freedom of choice (1997 [1973], 199-203). Sen does not necessarily equate the 
valuation of the ‘capability set’ with the personal valuation of the best element 
of the ‘capability set’ by person i. The personal valuation of the ‘capability set’ 
by person i might also depend on i’s valuation of the intrinsic value of choice or 
on his or her evaluation of the adequacy, range or diversity of the elements that 
are available to i (see section 2.5). In addition, ‘capability set’ evaluation may 
also take into account social or ethical valuation of the substantive freedoms 
that i enjoys.   
 
Empirical Applications of the ‘Capability Approach’ 
Sen’s empirical applications of the ‘capability approach’ have opened up new 
lines of enquiry and resulted in an important body of statistical evidence on 
human rights- focussed concerns. Sen’s empirical findings highlight the 
possibility of divergences between the expansion of economic growth and 
income on the one hand, and the expansion of valuable human capabilities on 
the other. They establish that economic growth and income can be poor 
predictors of the capability to live to a mature age (without succumbing to 
premature mortality) in different countries (e.g. India, China, Sri Lanka, Costa 
Rica, Jamaica) and for different population groups (e.g. black men versus other 
groups in the US; the population in the Indian state of Kerela versus populations 
in other states). As well as addressing the successes and limitations of market 
processes in securing the expansion of human capabilities and functionings, 
Sen’s empirical research provides important insights into the critical role of 
public policy in securing the human rights to freedom from hunger and 
starvation (e.g. Drèze and Sen (1989)). The idea that capabilities and 
functionings may be the most appropriate focal variables for a range of 
evaluative exercises concerning human interests has resulted in important new 
approaches to the analysis of poverty and inequality [e.g. Drèze and Sen (1989); 
Sen (1993a, 31-41; 1999a, 22-3,74-110)] and has had a major impact on 
international efforts to characterise and measure poverty and well-being and to 
evaluate the nature and adequacy of development. The UNDP’s Human Poverty 
Index captures deprivations in living standards (where ‘living standard’ is 
characterised in terms of access to safe water, health services and birth-weight), 
whilst the Human Development Index captures the importance of three crucially 
important and highly valuable human capabilities — the capability to achieve 
knowledge, longevity and a decent standard of living. These indices rival 
income-focussed measures and provide critical statistical information about the 
achievements and non-achievements of populations and groups. 
 
2.4  Gender discrimination 
Sen’s proposal that human equalities and inequalities be characterised and 
evaluated in capability space has moved the economic analysis of gender 
discrimination forward in innovative and important ways. The critique of utility 
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as an informational base for the characterisation and evaluation of individual 
advantage is partly motivated by concern with the impact of the conditioning of 
women’s preferences on individual choices and actions and the development of 
the ‘capability approach’ was in turn motivated by the need for a more adequate 
analytical space for the characterisation and evaluation of gender disparities in 
situations of power asymmetries, discrimination and entrenched disadvantage. 
Sen’s empirical research findings also establish statistical relationships between 
gender discrimination and capability inequality. For example, Sen’s analysis of 
the phenomenon of excess mortality and artificially lower survival rates of 
women in many parts of the world (the phenomenon of ‘Missing Women’) 
suggest that although excess mortality in women of a childbearing age could be 
partly explained by maternal mortality, no such explanation was possible for 
female disadvantage in survival in infancy and childhood. Evidence of lower 
female-male ratios in countries in Asia and North Africa is indicative of the 
influence of social factors resulting in gender inequality including gender 
discrimination and the comparative neglect of female health and nutrition 
(1999a, 104-7; Drèze and Sen (2002), 229-245). Other contributions in the field 
of gender discrimination include the analysis of underlying power asymmetries 
on the intra-household allocation bargaining situation (including the analysis of 
unequal gains in situations of ‘co-operative conflict’ and the use of ‘bargaining 
thresholds’ to improve allocative outcomes (e.g. Sen, 1990).43 
  
2.5  Civil and political rights  
Sen’s work has also moved the economics and human rights agenda forward by 
challenging the idea that there is an inevitable conflict between civil and 
political rights on the one hand, and effective development and growth on the 
other. The idea of a core of so-called ‘Asian values’ that are in some way 
opposed to civil and political rights — together with high growth rates in parts 
of East Asia during the 1980s and 1990s, and China’s recent record of 
development and poverty reduction — are sometimes invoked as evidence of 
the positive impact of authoritarianism on economic growth. However, Sen 
(1999a, 180-188; 1999b; 2000b) has emphasised that evidence from E. Asia 
must be balanced against contrary evidence from other regions. Even when 
Singapore and South Korea were growing faster than any other country in Asia, 
the fastest growing economy in Africa was Botswana — ‘a major defender of 
democracy’. In Sen’s view, the statistics go in contrary directions and do not 
yield a clear and unambiguous relationship.  
 
                                                     
43  The use of the capability framework for the analysis of gender is discussed and further 
developed by Nussbaum [especially in (Nussbaum 1995, 2000)]. The analysis of 
Sen’s ‘Missing Women’ is further discussed in Corell (2001). The question of 
whether or not the capability approach adequately addresses issues of power 
imbalances is discussed in Agarwal, Humphries and Robeyns (2003). 
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‘[S]ome relatively authoritarian states (such as South Korea … 
Singapore and, recently China) have had faster rates of economic 
growth than some less authoritarian ones (such as India, Costa Rica 
and Jamaica). But the overall picture is much more complex than 
these isolated observations might initially suggest, and systematic 
statistical studies give no real support to the claim that there is a 
general conflict between political rights and economic 
performance’ (1999b, 91). 
 
The instrumental role of civil and political rights in promoting effective 
development and growth 
Indeed, Sen’s empirical research findings suggest that human rights guarantees 
can often play an instrumental role in the promotion of effective development 
and growth and in the promotion of capability expansion and the fulfilment of 
basic needs. His work in this field has made an important contribution to the 
growing body of literature on economics and institutional conditions by 
establishing that democratic forms of government and civil and political rights 
protections can be of critical significance in the determination of incentives on 
governments and on public policy responses to social and economic shocks. For 
example, Sen has argued the patterns of risk and investments that predispose 
countries to financial and economic crisis can be partly explained by lack of 
transparency, disclosure and accountability in business, strong family links 
between the government and the private sector, and lack of public participation 
in and scrutiny of financial and business arrangements; and that governmental 
responses to economic and financial crises, and the chances of effective 
restructuring and reform, are critically affected by the absence or presence of 
democracy and human rights protections. In addition, Sen’s empirical research 
establish the ways in which democratic forms of government and civil and 
political rights protections can provide critical incentives to governments in the 
context of famine prevention — by empowering individuals to complain, 
ensuring that information is disseminated, exerting pressure on government and 
helping to precipitate a more effective public policy response. In particular, 
Sen’s empirical findings establish that no major famine has occurred in a 
democratic and independent country with a relatively free press, and that this 
statement applies not only to the affluent countries of Europe and America, but 
also to the poor but broadly democratic countries such as India. For example, 
the incidence of famines in India until independence in 1947 (for example, the 
Bengal famine in 1943 killed between 2 and 3 million people) contrasts with the 
post- independence experience following establishment of a multiparty 
democratic system and provides inter-temporal evidence of the positive impact 
of democracy in reducing the risk of famine. Furthermore, the Indian experience 
contrasts sharply with the experience of famine in China, where, when the 
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‘Great Leap Forward’ proved to be a mistake, disastrous policies were not 
corrected for three full years (1958 to 1961) — while 23 to 30 million people 
died (1999a, 180-188; 1999b, 90-93)44.  
 
2.6  ‘Freedom of choice’ and ‘opportunity freedom’  
Sen’s formal proposals for incorporating the ideas of ‘freedom of choice’ and 
‘opportunity freedom’ into mathematical and welfare economics also reflect an 
underlying concern with the idea of fundamental freedoms and human rights. 
His contributions in this area have focussed attention on the importance of 
process for economic assessment and evaluation — especially the opportunities 
that people have to choose and participate — and provide a basis of a re-
characterisation of the First Welfare Theorem in terms of ‘opportunity-freedom’ 
rather than utility.    
 
‘Freedom of choice’ 
Sen has criticised standard frameworks in economics for their lack of emphasis 
on agency and participation and has developed a series of technical proposals 
for incorporating the possibility of choosing and the range and adequacy of 
opportunities available into preference relations (‘chooser dependence’ and 
‘menu dependence’) and for the formal representation of constraints on choice 
(e.g. by distinguishing between (1) ‘optimizing’ choice functions requiring a 
best choice and (2) ‘maximizing’ choice functions requiring the choice of an 
alternative that is not judged to be worse than any other (e.g. Sen 1997a). 
Proposals for enhancing the formal representation of the nature and scope of 
individual options in economic analysis have also included the development of 
                                                     
44  There is a growing body of literature analysing the instrumental role of civil and 
political rights in promoting effective development and growth. World Bank (1998) 
discusses the importance of a range of variables including personal freedoms and 
liberties (e.g. from slavery, forced and bonded labor), property rights, freedom of 
economic transactions, women’s equality (e.g. freedom from labour market exclusion 
and non-discrimination in relation to property rights); ‘good governance’ and 
institutional conditions (e.g. access to justice); and civil society and stake holder 
participation in the design and implementation of development projects and policies. 
Stiglitz (1999) analyses the adverse economic effects of the failure to respect the right 
to freedom of information. He finds that whereas informational asymmetries create 
barriers to entry that advantage ‘insiders’ over ‘outsiders’ and can result in corruption 
and distortions in private and public decision-making, greater access to information 
can reduce the magnitude and consequences of these agency problems, resulting in 
more efficient resource allocation. The critical importance of non-income variables 
including institutional context is also analysed in Besley and Burgess (2002), who 
develop a model of the determinants of government responsiveness to the needs of 
vulnerable citizens. Their empirical findings suggest that, in the Indian context, 
electoral turnout, political competition and mass media can affect government 
activism vis-à-vis calamity relief and food distribution.  
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formal axioms for capturing and formalising the idea of individual ‘opportunity-
freedom’ (e.g. 1991, 1993e). These axioms relate the assessment of freedom to 
the evaluation of the nature and scope of the options available, and the 
preferences and values of the individuals concerned. This approach challenges 
(1) cardinality-based formulations that characterise individual freedom purely in 
terms of the number of options available (e.g. Pattanaik and Xu (1990)); (2) 
‘flexibility-based’ formulations that suggest that uncertainty about future tastes 
is a reason for valuing current time freedom of choice in economics (e.g. Arrow 
(1995)). Sen rejects (1) on the grounds that it fails to give weight to the value of 
the options available to the individual concerned; and (2) on the grounds it 
represents a purely ‘instrumental approach’ that fails to reflect the intrinsic 
value of freedom of choice. In cases where there is no uncertainty, a set of 
options would still be evaluated in terms of the value of the maximal (most 
preferred/chosen) element or elements in the choice set — with the other 
elements of the menu not being taken into account.  
 
The characterisation of the First Welfare Freedom in ‘Opportunity-Freedom’ 
Space 
The formal axioms discussed above also provide the basis of a re-
characterisation of the First Theorem of Welfare Economics in terms of 
‘opportunity-freedom’ rather than utility. Standard frameworks equate 
economic efficiency with the efficiency of utilities and assume that (1) 
preferences are determined by choices; (2) choices are motivated by self-
interested welfare maximization. Sen has argued that the basic analytical results 
of the ‘Arrow-Debreu’ Theorem are independent of assumption (2) and that the 
proposition that competitive market outcomes are efficient under certain 
conditions (such as the absence of externalities) will hold if some interpretation 
of individual advantage other than utility is adopted (with the utility-based 
interpretation of Pareto Optimality loosing its status as necessary condition for 
social optimality). For example, his results establish that the basic efficiency 
results reflected in the ‘Direct Theorem’ can be carried over from the ‘space’ of 
utilities to the ‘space’ of individual substantive opportunity-freedoms (both in 
terms of freedom to choose commodity baskets and in terms of capabilities to 
function) (Sen 1991, 1993e, 1999a). 
 
2.7  ‘Liberty-rights’ and ‘basic rights’  
Sen has finally moved human rights based discourse in economics forward by 
developing a series of influential proposals for incorporating the ideas of 
‘liberty-rights’ and ‘basic-rights’ into the theory of social choice. His 
contributions in this area provide a framework for the social-choice theoretical 
representation of individual rights; formalise the tension between the Pareto 
criterion and the notion of a ‘protected private sphere’; and provide a 
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framework for the future development of the formal representation of basic 
(fundamental or human) rights in economics and social choice. 
 
Liberty-rights 
The proposals set out in Sen (1970ab, 1983b, 1992b, 1995, 1996ab, 2002, 581-
659) modify and extend Arrow’s (1963 [1951]) framework for social choice by 
introducing an explicit condition that captured the idea that social choice 
procedure should respect individual liberty-rights. Whereas the framework for 
social choice developed by Arrow required that the social choice procedure 
should respect the condition of non-dictatorship, Sen (1970b) strengthened this 
condition by introducing the stronger requirement that the social choice 
procedure should respect individual ‘liberty-rights’ by introducing conditions 
that make individuals ‘decisive’ over social outcomes. If an individual prefers x 
to y — and if the choice between x and y is reasonably characterised as falling 
within his or her personal domain — then the fulfilment of individual liberty-
rights requires that this individual preference determines the social preference 
relation in this respect. Social states that fail to respect individual liberty-rights 
are then evaluated as ‘worse’ than social states in which individual liberty-rights 
are respected and fulfilled. Sen’s ‘Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal’ result 
captures and formalise a potential conflict between the principle of Pareto 
Optimality (asserting the priority of unanimous preference rankings) and 
individual liberty (conceptualised as freedom of choice within a private 
domain). The result establishes that if at least two individuals are guaranteed 
that their preference will be decisive for social preference in relation to at least 
one pair-wise choice that is reasonably characterised as falling within the 
personal domain, then contradictory cycles may result (e.g. x socially preferred 
to y, y to z and z to x) for some set of preferences. Therefore, if a social choice 
procedure satisfies the Pareto principle, it may sometimes fail to satisfy even a 
minimal expression of liberal values (1982e [1976] 314-5). 
 
‘Basic Rights’ 
Critics of Sen’s social choice-theoretic formulation of individual rights have 
argued that the idea of individual rights cannot be captured in terms of 
individual ‘decisiveness’ over social outcomes, and have highlighted the 
relevance of game-theoretic frameworks for capturing and formalising the idea 
of individual rights. For example, Gaertner et al (1992) capture and formalise 
the idea of individual rights in terms of admissible behavioural strategies — 
with individual rights and duties conceptualised in terms of the permission of 
each agent to choose admissible strategies, and the obligation not to choose a 
non-admissible strategy. Sen has in turn highlighted in the limitations of 
formulations that focus exclusively on formal permissions and obligations to act 
or not to act in terms of the critique of ‘consequence-independence’ set out in 
Part I. Whereas game-theoretic models of liberties and rights often reflect the 
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Hayekian-Nozickian position on outcome-independence, Sen has argued that 
the likely consequences of different game-form specifications should be 
analysed in terms of the things that people value in the domain of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights. This concern can be achieved within a game-
theoretic framework by working backwards — from consequences to 
antecedents — and taking account of the social states ‘induced’ by the 
specification of sets of admissible strategies in a game-form. In this way, the 
game-theoretic approach can be conceptualised in terms of the specification of 
sets of derived rights or rules for bringing about the affirmation and realization 
of sets of basic rights (Sen, 1995, 14; also see 1992b, 152; 1996a, 31; 2002, 
581-659).45 
 
Conclusion 
This Paper has analysed the contributions of Nobel Laureate Professor Amartya 
Sen in the field of human rights. It has been argued that Sen’s work has 
expanded and deepened human rights discourse by opening up new lines of 
enquiry in both ethics and economics and by promoting cross-fertilisation and 
integration on the subject of human rights across traditional disciplinary divides. 
In ethics, Sen has challenged the exclusion of poverty, hunger and starvation 
                                                     
45  More recent contributions in the broader literature are reflective of this argument and 
emphasise the distinction between sets of basic (or higher order) rights (that are 
modelled in a preference- and consequence-sensitive way), and sets of ‘derived rights’ 
(that focus on the specification of admissible behavioural strategies). For example, 
Hammond suggests that the choice of a rights-configuration can be conceptualised in 
terms of the choice of a game form ‘that induces these rights’ (1996, 83). Peleg’s 
(1998) model can accommodate rights can be captured and formalized in terms of sets 
of available individual strategies in a game form and ‘higher level’ rights that cannot 
be readily interpreted in terms of restrictions on behavioural strategies. Pattanaik and 
Suzumura (1994, 1996) embed game-theoretic formulations of individual rights in a 
broader model of the social choice of a rights structure that relates the conferment of 
individual rights to individual preferences (through a social welfare function) and to 
outcomes (through ‘consequence-sensitive’ informational loops). Suzumura (1999-
2000) further develops the consequence-sensitive approach whilst Fleurbaey and Van 
Hees (2000) relate the distinction between basic rights (defined in terms of guarantees 
of states of affairs) and derived rights (defined in terms of admissible strategies in a 
game form) to the distinction between human rights that everyone should have, and 
the actual positive rights that are codified in particular legal systems. They also 
develop the ideas of rights-incompatibility and rights-realizations and (with Fleurbaey 
and Gaertner 1996) take the game-theoretic approach forward by developing the 
distinctions between different broad categories of rights (active/passive rights, 
negative/positive). Van Hees (1995, 1996), introduces the distinctions between 
different rights types (claim, power, liberty, immunity) into the game-theoretic 
framework. 
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from the characterisation of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and has 
contributed to the development of a framework in which authoritatively 
recognised international standards in the field of poverty and human rights can 
be meaningfully conceptualised and coherently understood. In economics, Sen 
has set out a far-reaching critique of standard frameworks that fail to take ac 
count of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and has pioneered the 
development of new paradigms and approaches that focus on human rights-
centred concerns. This development of a ‘scholarly bridge’ between human 
rights and economics has been shown to be an innovative and important 
contribution that has methodological as well as substantive importance, and that 
provides a prototype and stimuli for future research. Key challenges in taking 
this work forward include:  
 
? Clarification and further conceptual development in relation to 
foundational issues. Sen has been criticised for failing to resolve 
important foundational issues relating to the capabilities, human rights 
and obligations. Further clarification is required in relation to (1) the 
question of the primary concept in Sen’s conceptual framework;46 (2) the 
need for principles and/or procedures for resolving the question of 
relative value;47 (3) the debate around ‘capability set’ evaluation.48 
                                                     
46  Are freedoms, capabilities, human rights or obligations the primary or foundational 
concept in Sen’s conceptual framework? The interpretation set out in section 1.3 
suggests the primacy of freedoms and ‘capability-freedoms’. However, the possibility 
of a more fundamental role for the idea of human rights is sometimes suggested (e.g. 
1984: 310). Furthermore, the concept of obligation could also be viewed as 
fundamental (on which, see Vizard 2004c). 
47  The question of relative value is discussed in Williams (1987, 100-102), Glover 
(1995, 124-125), O’Neill (1995, 144), Crocker (1995: 191), Alkire (2002), Robeyns 
(2003). Sen has challenged completeness as a condition of ethical and socio-economic 
evaluation, and defended the view of ‘capability space’ as ‘substantially incomplete’, 
whilst nevertheless acknowledging that the ‘capability approach’ may require 
supplementation with a background theory of ethical or social value (e.g. 1987a: 100-
108; 1992a: 32-49; 1993: 47). Nussbaum contends that Sen’s treatment of the 
‘capability approach’ is too vague and fails to differentiate valuable freedoms from 
the trivial and the bad and has defended the necessity of applying and extending the 
capability approach on the basis of a definite list (e.g. 1993, 1995, 1999abc, 2001, 
2003, 2004). For further discussion of the issues and a proposal that treats the 
‘capability space’ as substantially incomplete and that adopts authoritative 
international standards in the field of poverty and human rights as a basis for selecting 
a list of relevant capabilities that will be relevant in the context of human rights 
advocacy, see Vizard (2000, 2004ab, forthcoming (Conclusion)).  
48  Sen has emphasised the central importance of the capabilities that people have reasons 
to value (taking into account, for example, meta-preferences and counterfactual 
choices). The clarificatory remarks in Sen (1991) affirm that the evaluation of the 
capabilities a person enjoys entails (1) reflective valuation by the individuals 
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? Further development of principles and/or procedures for dealing 
with limitations, trade-offs and priorities. Sen has addressed many of 
the traditional objections to the evaluation of fundamental freedoms and 
human rights in consequential ethical systems. Nevertheless, important 
issues remain unresolved. In particular, the ‘consequence-sensitive’ 
approach will require principles and/or procedures to provide the basis for 
limitations and trade-offs and for establishing priorities in the context of 
resource and feasibility constraints. In addition, further principles and 
procedures are required to address the ‘implausibility challenge’ and to 
delimit the general positive obligations of assistance and aid ‘of those in a 
position to help’. Sen’s recent emphasis on the concept of 
‘reasonableness’ may be important here.49 
? Further development of the research programme on economics and 
human rights. Sen’s work provides a ‘scholarly bridge’ between 
economics and human rights of the type highlighted by Mary Robinson, 
former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. His proposals for 
incorporating new variables and concerns into theoretical and empirical 
economic analysis provide a framework for the instrumental and intrinsic 
valuation of human rights in economic analysis and the basis for a 
research programme addressing the need for (1) further development of a 
technical apparatus that incorporates human rights-based criteria into 
economic analysis; (2) further analysis of the impact of economic 
arrangements and processes on fundamental freedoms and human rights; 
(3) further analysis of the instrumental role of fundamental freedoms and 
human rights in promoting development and growth.  
 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
concerned; (2) critical scrutiny of the ‘reasons’ underlying preference. Sen (2004: 15-
16) also suggests the need for a framework of objective reasons and of public 
reasoning in the identification of a class of fundamental freedoms human rights. 
Further clarification of the nature and content of this framework is required. 
49  See Sen (2004: 10-12) for the distinction between ‘reasonable action’ and 
‘compulsory action’ and Vizard (2004c) for further discussion of the implications of 
Sen’s treatment of this issue for a theory of ‘universal imperfect obligation’.  
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